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A PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY FOR THE JUDICIAL
REGULATION OF INSURANCE POLICIES

DANIEL SCHWARCZ*
ABSTRACT

Many insurance law commentators believe that judges should
regulate the substance of insurancepolicies by refusing to enforce
insurancepolicy terms that are exploitive or otherwise unfair. The
most common guide for the judicial regulation of insurancepolicies
is the "reasonableexpectations doctrine," which requires courts to
disregardcoverage restrictionsthat are beyond insureds'reasonable
expectations unless the insurer specifically informed the insured
about the restrictionat the time ofpurchase. This Article arguesthat
although the judiciary has a potential role to play in policing
insurancepolicy terms, that role should not be defined by reference
to consumers' reasonable expectations. Instead, by drawing on the
parallels between insurance policies and ordinary consumer
products, this Article advances a products liability framework for
understanding how and why courts should regulate insurance
policies. It proposes that,just as firms that make defective products
must pay for the resulting injuries, insurers that issue "defective"
insurancepolicies should have to provide coverage to insureds. The
Article argues that the usefulness of the analogy to products liability
law goes well beyond understanding the normative basis for the
judicial regulationof insurancepolicies.Products liability law offers
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importantinsights into how courts can efficiently correctfailures in
insurance markets by encouragingeffective disclosure to consumers
and appropriatelysetting penalties so that insurers take an optimal
amount of care in draftingpolicy terms.
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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, insurers
feared no one more than Trent Lott. Not only did the Mississippi
senator have an obvious political incentive to insist that insurers
pay for as much of the unprecedented hurricane damage as possible,
he had a strong personal incentive as well: his house lay in ruins,
and his insurer insisted that it was not liable for the damage as
Lott's policy excluded coverage for all losses caused by flooding.'
Lott-like thousands of other hurricane victims along the Gulf
Coast facing similar resistance from their insurers 2-- quickly filed
suit, claiming that his insurer's reliance on the flood exclusion
violated his "reasonable expectation" of coverage. 3 Lott had purchased a "Hurricane Deductible Endorsement" precisely so that he
would be covered for hurricane damage.' He argued that the
insurer, by offering this endorsement, had fostered an expectation
that he "would have full and comprehensive coverage for any and all
hurricane damage."5 It was that expectation that mattered, Lott
claimed, and not the technical wording of the insurance policy.6
Lott's basic argument, which is echoed in the lawsuits of thousands of other hurricane victims,' is founded in a controversial rule
of insurance law known as the "reasonable expectations doctrine."
Under the doctrine, insureds are entitled to the insurance coverage
they reasonably expect even though the applicable policy terms
1. See Complaint

17, Lott v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05-cv-00671-LTS-RHW

(S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2005).
2. See Jim Hood, Op-Ed., A Policy of Deceit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at A15
(explaining the broad-ranging lawsuit the Mississippi Attorney General's office brought
against insurers to force them to cover all water damage that policyholders suffered as a
result of hurricanes).
3. Complaint, supranote 1, 14.
4. Id. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See id. 11.
6. See id. 14.
7. See Jeremy Alford & Joseph B. Treaster, Was It Wind or Water? Gulf Coast Lawyer
Is Taking On Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at Cl; Jennifer Bayot, Mississippi Sues
Insurers over Damage from Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at C4; Joseph B. Treaster &
Cornelia Dean, Yet Another Victim of Katrina: FederalFlood Insurance Program Is Itself
Under Water, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at C1.
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unambiguously exclude such coverage.' Insureds, therefore, can
overcome unambiguously applicable exclusions in their policies if an
objectively reasonableinsured would expect coverage on the basis of
factors such as policy language and structure, the insurer's marketing practices, underwriting theory, and generalized beliefs among
consumers about the scope of different types of insurance.9 Lott's
complaint advanced each of these arguments: It claimed that the
policy's language-in particular, its "Hurricane Deductible
Endorsement"--created an expectation of complete hurricane
coverage, and that Lott's insurance agent implicitly fostered this
expectation. 10 It also suggested that the insurer's advertising
campaign, which held the insurer out as a "[g]ood [n]eighbor,"
reinforced this expectation." Finally, it argued that most ordinary
consumers would reasonably expect that hurricane insurance
coverage would cover losses due to flooding associated with a
hurricane."
Seizing on the breadth of the arguments available to those
invoking the reasonable expectations doctrine, some have suggested that it inappropriately legitimizes "judge-made insurance."' 3
But most insurance law commentators view the doctrine as a
sensible response to the argument that insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion, which sophisticated insurers unilaterally
draft and offer to uninformed consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.14 Commentators have argued that, without the threat of the
8. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARv. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). Keeton initially suggested that courts should enforce "[t]he
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts ... even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
have negated those expectations." Id.
9. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323,
371 (1986). Keeton himself did not elaborate on exactly how courts would discern insureds'
reasonable expectations, but clearly did envision that sources other than the policy's text
could inform the determination. See Keeton, supra note 8, at 967.
10. Complaint, supra note 1,
13-14.
11. Id. 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. See id. 14.
13. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-made Law and Judge-made Insurance:
Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1981)
(arguing that the doctrine is "an unprincipled judicial preference for the insured" that must
be limited).
14. See generally Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
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"judicial regulation of insurance"-the ex post alteration of an
insurance policy's provisions by courts' 5-insurers would exploit
unwary consumers by inserting unfair coverage exclusions into
insurance policies. 6 Not only does a reasonable expectations rule
protect consumers from such exploitation, according to this view,
but it also encourages insurers to inform consumers about potentially surprising terms because insurers can avoid liability under
the doctrine by adjusting inaccurate consumer expectations before
the policy is purchased.1 7
Despite this relatively widespread support from insurance law
commentators, the reasonable expectations doctrine suffers from
serious practical and theoretical failures. 8 Only a handful of state
courts follow the rule, and the case law endorsing it is confused and
inconsistent.' 9 Moreover, contract law scholars have largely
debunked the contracts-of-adhesion argument on which the
reasonable expectations doctrine was originally justified. They have
established that neither consumer assent nor government regulation is necessary to lead firms to design efficient standard forms
when market forces work sufficiently well.2" Given the doctrine's
After Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998).
15. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Insurance Effects of Regulation by Litigation, in
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 212-33 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). Abraham notes a
number of plausible ways to define insurance regulation through litigation. See id. at 231-33.
16. See Keeton, supra note 8, at 968; see also JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF
INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS 311-19 (1994)
(noting that traditional contract principles do not always fit well with insurance law); James
M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text
Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1055 (1992) (noting that insureds are uninformed about
their insurance needs); Rahdert, supranote 9, at 371 (arguing that "[riecurring questions such
as the enforceability of business risk exclusions" lead to uncertainty in the law); Bob Works,
Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy ConditionsIn Order To Avoid Disproportionate
Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 553-57 (1998-99)
(suggesting that "the vulnerability that results from sequential performance of aleatory
contracts" can be addressed through the use of "contract law as an ex post governance
mechanismo for controlling opportunism").
17. Keeton, supra note 8, at 968.
18. See Jeffrey Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of JudicialRole, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181,
182 (1998-99) (describing the reasonable expectation doctrine's "attraction to academics but
resistance from elements of bench and bar").
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See generally Richard Craswell, Passingon the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 363 (1991) (arguing that
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stunted evolution in the courts and the academic undermining of its
core rationale, it is hardly surprising that some view it to be both
antiquated and largely irrelevant. 2' Because the reasonable
expectations doctrine has served as the primary theoretical and
doctrinal construct for the judicial regulation of insurance over the
past forty years, the demise of the reasonable expectations doctrine
has corresponded with the demise of judicial intervention in the
content of insurance policies.
This Article seeks to reinvigorate the idea that limited judicial
regulation of insurance may be in the best interests of insurance
consumers.2 Focusing on consumer-oriented markets for property/casualty insurance,2 3 it claims that the market mechanisms
that ordinarily lead firms to draft efficient standard-form contracts
may fail to produce socially optimal results in many insurance
selecting a mandatory rule is necessary only when sellers' "incentives are flawed by some
market failure"); George L. Priest, A Theory of the ConsumerProduct Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1313 (1981) (arguing that the market will lead manufacturers to provide consumers
with the optimal warranty coverage); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information
in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warrantiesand Security Interests, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1389 (1983) (maintaining that consumers understand the most important terms
in standard contracts).
21. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 61-62 (1998-99) (arguing that "courts rarely invoke the [reasonable
expectations] doctrine in practice" and its analytical framework has been largely irrelevant
to many of the most significant developments in insurance law in the last thirty years).
22. This Article thus relies on a welfare-economics framework to identify normatively
preferable outcomes. On the overlap, and relationship between, fairness considerations and
welfare economics, see generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE (2002).
23. Property/casualty insurance covers legal liabilities and losses to property and incomeproducing assets. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 13A (2d ed.
1996). It is typically contrasted with personal lines of insurance, such as health, life, or
disability. This Article's focus on property/casualty insurance is motivated by the significant
differences between property/casualty insurance markets and insurance markets for personal
lines of insurance. Most notably, many personal lines of insurance, particularly health and
disability, are sold as group policies through employers. See id. § 13C; see also Jeffrey R.
Brown & Austan Goolsbee, Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive?Evidence from
the Life InsuranceIndustry 3 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., KSG Working
Paper No. 00-007, 2000), availableat http://ssrn.comabstract=253795 (noting that, in 1998,
only 22% of all life insurance policies were purchased by individuals). Moreover, although the
reasonable expectations rule applies to all variations of insurance coverage, see STEMPEL,
supra note 16, at 323-24, most reasonable expectations cases involve property/casualty
insurance. In part this is because insurance sold through group plans is often subject to the
procedural limitations of ERISA. See id.
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markets. In part this is because various unique features of the
property/casualty insurance industry, such as policy standardization, the use of endorsements, and price regulation, limit the
effectiveness of market mechanisms.2 4 But it is also because
consumer behavior in many of these insurance markets departs
from the assumptions of the standard economic model: consumers
in property/casualty insurance markets tend to be ill-informed about
policy details and to ignore nonsalient policy terms.25 In the absence
of government intervention, insurers may have an incentive to
exploit these consumer limitations by drafting inefficient terms.26
Because state administrative regulation of substantive policy
terms is both inherently and practically limited, targeted judicial
intervention to prevent such insurer overreaching is potentially
appropriate.2 7
Given the failures of the reasonable expectations doctrine in
defining the appropriate contours of such judicial intervention, this
Article advances a products liability model for the judicial regulation of insurance. Although several commentators have previously
explored the implications of products liability law for contract law,
none have done so in the context of insurance policies. 28 The model
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. Richard Craswell has suggested that the basic rule in products liability, that plaintiffs
should be required to show a reasonable alternative design, should be applied to contract law.
See Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentationand Nondisclosure in
ContractLaw and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 624 (2006) [hereinafter Craswell, Taking
Information Seriously] (noting that the proposal that plaintiffs be required to suggest
alternative disclosure "would bring misrepresentation and nondisclosure closer to design
defect cases in torts, in which the plaintiff generally must identify some alternative to the
manufacturer's design"). He has also explored products liability law in the context of deceptive
advertising. See Richard Craswell, InterpretingDeceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657,
681 (1985). Robert Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski have also noted some parallels between
products liability law and the judicial interpretation of standard-form contracts. See Robert
A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 444 (2002). In the insurance law literature, several commentators have
recognized the similarities of products liability law and the reasonable expectations doctrine,
but none have elaborated on them. See Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts
Enforce InsurancePolicyholders'Objectively Reasonable Expectationsof Insurance Coverage,
5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 422-23 (1998-99) (suggesting that insurance in general is a defective
product because of the discrepancy between what insurers suggest they sell in advertising and
what they actually sell); James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is

1398

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1389

provides analytical clarity as to why courts should potentially
regulate the content of insurance policies: these policies are
consumer products,2 9 and, in certain cases, they may be "defectively"
designed. By requiring that firms pay damages to consumers who
are "injured" by these defective insurance products, the judicial
regulation of insurance can induce insurers to design their products
optimally despite consumer ignorance and bounded rationality.
Just as products liability law attempts to promote social efficiency
by placing obligations on firms beyond what they "agreed" to give to
the consumer,3" appropriately tailored "judge-made insurance" has
the potential to help promote the efficient drafting of insurance
policies.3 1
Products liability law not only clarifies the normative case for
why courts should occasionally deviate from insurance policy terms,
but also provides a practical and theoretically sound doctrinal
structure for implementing this principle." First, products liability
law suggests that informing consumers about product information
Indispensable,if We Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 158 (1998-99) (noting that
"judicial expectations regarding the proper contours of insurance law forces carriers to provide
a consumer-safe and consumer-friendly package of coverage, much like product liability law
encourages manufacturers to build and equip a reasonably safe vehicle consistent with so
called 'consumer expectations").
29. See Anderson & Fournier, supra note 28, at 423 ("In the past, insurance policies were
treated as contracts. Today, more and more they are treated like products."); Ian R. Macneil,
Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5, 18-19 (1984) (using term
"bureaucratic good" to describe contracts of adhesion such as insurance policies); W. David
Slawson, StandardForm Contracts and DemocraticControl of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 529, 546 (1971) (describing the sale of insurance as the "sales of promises"); see also
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 46 (2003)
(discussing the practice within the insurance industry of referring to insurance policies as
"products").
30. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 280-81 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 258-59
(2004); W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 64-66 (1991) ("[The] rationale for
liability is that it replaces incentives that are missing when the market is not functioning
perfectly."); Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of ProductSafety and Imperfect Information,
5 BELLJ. ECON. &MGMT. SCI. 683,683 (1974); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor Products Liability
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 380 (1988).
31. See infra Part I.C.
32. Comparing insurance law to products liability law is thus a worthwhile endeavor. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744 (1993)
("For analogical reasoning to work well, we have to say that the relevant, known similarities
give us good reason to believe that there are further similarities and thus help to answer an
open question.").
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is not as easy as the reasonable expectations doctrine supposes.
Because consumers can only digest a limited amount of information,
requiring firms to perfect consumer information is not sensible.
Instead, products liability law requires firms to inform consumers
about particularly important safety risks and to provide instructions
in an easy-to-read and obviously visible manner.3 3 A doctrine for the
judicial regulation of insurance should similarly recognize consumers' bounded rationality and focus insurers' disclosure obligations on
a limited number of particularly important terms, instead of all
terms that a consumer might not reasonably expect. Adopting a
more limited and narrowly tailored disclosure requirement could
both enhance insurers' compliance with legal standards and
promote the effective operation of consumer insurance markets.
Second, products liability law suggests that any regime for the
judicial regulation of insurance must be limited in scope and should
incorporate a cost/benefit analysis to determine when insurers
should be required to cover losses that their policies unambiguously
exclude. Several decades ago, the dominant standard in products
liability law for defining a product design defect turned on whether
the product was inconsistent with ordinary consumers' safety
expectations.34 However, in intervening years, most courts and
scholars have abandoned this consumer-expectations approach to
defining product design defects, in favor of a "risk-utility test. 35
Under this test, products are defectively designed when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by a product could have been
reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.3"
Although imperfect, the test does a better job than the antiquated
consumer-expectations test of identifying unsafe product features
that are the result of a manufacturer's inefficient attention to
product safety. The efficiency of consumer insurance markets
could be enhanced if insurance law moved in the same direction,
abandoning a rule based on consumer expectations in favor of one
that tested whether an insurer could have drafted a policy differently, ex ante, to allocate risks more efficiently.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See
See
See
See

infra text accompanying notes 219-21.
infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
infra note 278 and accompanying text.
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Relying on these structural lessons from products liability law,
this Article constructs and evaluates a model in which judges
impose insurance coverage in the case of either a "defective
insurance warning" or an "insurance policy design defect." A
"defective insurance warning" would occur when insurers fail to
adequately warn insureds about a limited number of coverage
limitations that are most likely to enhance the overall efficiency of
coverage. This Article tentatively proposes that these warnings
should disclose any substantial deviations from industry norms in
policy language and inform insureds that they may not be covered
for losses that they easily could have prevented. It also suggests
that insurance warnings could inform consumers about stateunderwritten supplemental insurance options and perhaps even
"debias" consumers by focusing their attention on certain salient
limits of insurance. The "policy design defect," by contrast, would
discourage insurers' use of exploitive terms ex ante and correct for
those terms ex post. When a policy exclusion applied in a way that
might be inconsistent with its underwriting purpose, an insured
would be deemed to have been "harmed" by his policy. In such cases,
insurers would have to compensate the victims of such insurance
harms if the insured could demonstrate a foreseeable and reasonable alternative policy design that would have avoided the insurance harm.
Ultimately, this Article stops short of affirmatively recommending
that courts immediately adopt the proposed products liability model.
The desirability of the model depends on how poorly insurance
markets operate, how well judges can perform the inquiries required
of them by the proposed doctrinal structure, and the impact the
proposal would have on insurance litigation. Although this Article
suggests that the initial analysis favors the products liability model
on these fronts, significant counterarguments exist that ought not
to be dismissed without further research and debate. What is clear,
however, is that products liability law, and not the reasonable
expectations doctrine, provides the best touchstone for assessing
the costs and benefits of an interventionist judicial approach to
insurance disputes.
Part I of this Article provides an updated justification for the
judicial regulation of insurance policies. It concludes that certain
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structural elements of the insurance industry exacerbate the
consequences of imperfect consumer information and bounded
rationality in many insurance markets. Part II argues that the
reasonable expectations doctrine's shaky practical and theoretical
foundations render it unsuitable for defining the role of judges in
regulating insurance. Finally, Part III develops and evaluates the
central proposal of this Article: products liability law can potentially
serve as an effective template for guiding the judicial regulation of
insurance policies.
I. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REGULATION OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY
INSURANCE

Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, courts routinely
treated insurance policies as ordinary contracts that should
generally be enforced as written.3 7 Starting in the 1950s and 1960s,
though, a new generation of scholars began to challenge this
approach, arguing that contracts of adhesion, such as insurance
policies, create unique risks of consumer exploitation." These
scholars suggested that courts should take a correspondingly
interventionist approach to construing such standard-form contracts
in order to protect consumers from unanticipated exploitive terms. 39
In no field of law were these arguments more successful than in
insurance. Finding state regulation of insurance policies inadequate, insurance law commentators quickly embraced a novel
37. See SAMUEL WILLuSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900 (Walter H.E.

Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1963); see also Peter Nash Swisher, Symposium Introduction,5 CONN. INS.
L.J. 1, 3-6 (1998-99) (discussing Williston's "contractually based interpretation of insurance
contracts"). The doctrines of estoppel and waiver supplied only limited exceptions to this
principle, applicable when the insurer or agent affirmatively misled an insured who relied on
those misrepresentations, or voluntarily relinquished a right created in the insurance policy.
See STEMPEL, supra note 16, §§ 3.1-.5. See generallyClarence Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in
InsurancePolicy Litigation,105 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928-29 (1957). Whether an insured party
understood the terms of an insurance policy, or may have expected terms different from those
contained in the policy, was immaterial as the insured had a duty to read these terms. See
STEMPEL, supra note 16, § 3.4.

38. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983); Slawson, supra note 29, at 546.
39. See Rakoff, supra note 38, at 1175 (observing that "there is a quite general perception
that different law must be applied to contracts of adhesion").
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"reasonable expectations" doctrine to combat the perceived risks
associated with contracts of adhesion.4" This doctrine, moreover, was
not the only newly emerging vehicle for the ex post judicial regulation of insurance policy content: courts routinely found insurance
policies unconscionable,4 1 and in one notable case concluded that
policy terms violated an insurer's implied warranty of fitness."
Since commentators and courts first embraced the judicial
regulation of insurance, modern contract law theorists have largely
debunked the claim that contracts of adhesion present unique
risks for consumer exploitation. Although consumer assent to
standard-form contracts is limited, such contracts are subject to
market forces that can encourage firms to draft efficient, rather
than exploitive, terms.4" In fact, firms will generally have an
incentive to draft efficient form contracts so long as a sufficient
percentage of consumers (1) are informed about the content of those
terms,4 4 and (2) act rationally to maximize their utility on the basis
40. See generally Symposium, supra note 14 (discussing the reasonable expectations
doctrine in insurance law); see also Keeton, supra note 8, at 967 (same).
41. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 16, § 7.
42. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins., 227 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Iowa 1975). An
implied warranty of fitness for insurance has never garnered significant support. See Rahdert,
supra note 9, at 339 & n.54.
43. See Craswell, supra note 20, at 363; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 20, at 1389. See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8 (6th ed. 2003). Empirical
evidence lends some support to the basic model of standard-form contracts in some markets.
See Priest, supra note 20, at 1313 (reviewing warranty provisions and finding that they were
both generally efficient and unaffected by market structure); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
Competition and the Quality of StandardForm Contracts:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Software
License Agreements (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 05-11, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799274 (confirming Priest's
conclusion that market share does not affect the quality of standard-form terms). Even under
ideal market conditions, firms may find including one-sided terms in their form contracts
efficient when courts are imperfectly informed. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner,
One-sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827 (2006).
However, this potential is immaterial here because firms only rely on inefficient terms in
these circumstances to defend against opportunistic customers. See id.
44. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 20, at 1398-99; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:A Legal and Economic Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 630 (1979). Although consumers must be informed about both contract
terms and the facts of the world that the contract regulates, most tend to focus their attention
on the former. This limitation is particularly appropriate in the insurance context, in which
information asymmetries regarding the underlying risks are generally thought to favor
consumers, leading to problems in the supply of insurance rather than the demand. See
generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
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of that information.4 5 In light of this modern understanding, it is
now clear that the real issue for evaluating the efficiency of
insurance policies, and the concomitant need for legal intervention
-whether via the judiciary or state regulators-is whether, and in
what ways, existing market mechanisms fail to ensure efficient
insurance policy terms.4 6 If consumers are systematically uninformed about standard contract terms, or biased with regard to
processing information about those terms, then insurance policies
may indeed be exploitive in the absence of government intervention.4 7
This Part argues that the significant risks of such market failure
may warrant judicial regulation of insurance policies.4" Part L.A
begins the argument by contending that structural elements of
many consumer-oriented property/casualty insurance marketsMarkets:An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 629 (1976).
45. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217-18 (2003).
46. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 1047 ("Tlhe courts' fixation on the concepts of'contract
of adhesion' and 'bargaining disparity' has caused the judiciary to misidentify the problem,"
which actually "is with information imbalance."); Rahdert, supra note 9, at 374 ('Those courts
that have addressed the policy considerations behind the reasonable expectations doctrine
have overemphasized adhesion and unconscionability.").
47. Firms facing systematically uninformed or irrational consumers may have an
incentive to save costs by drafting exploitive terms. See Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional
Changeand the Quasi-invisibleHand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485 (1974); Michael I. Meyerson,
The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L.
REV. 583, 595 (1990). This outcome is especially likely in a price competitive industry, where
competition may force firms to use inefficiently exploitive terms in order to support low prices.
See Oren Bar-Gil, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2004). See generally
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking BehavioralismSeriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, The Problem]
(stating that economic incentives cause "manufacturers to engage in practices that ...
utilize
non-rational consumer tendencies to influence consumer preferences and perceptions for
gain"); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation,112 HARv. L. REV. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some
Evidence] (presenting "empirical evidence of market manipulation").
48. The analysis is thus limited to consumer-oriented insurance markets, rather than
insurance markets in which purchasers are sophisticated business enterprises. One objection
to this dichotomy is that policy terms in consumer-oriented insurance markets are often quite
similar, if not identical, to policy terms in more business-oriented insurance markets. For this
reason, one might plausibly claim that, to the extent there are inefficiencies in insurance
markets, they must not be limited to consumer insurance markets. This Article is not opposed
to the concept that business-oriented insurance markets may indeed be quite inefficient, but
neither is it committed to that concept. Policy terms that may be inefficient in consumeroriented markets may be quite efficient in business-oriented markets.
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including policy standardization, the widespread use of endorsements, and price regulation-mean that comparatively small levels
of consumer misinformation or bounded rationality may result in
exploitive insurance policies. Part I.B, in turn, claims that available
empirical evidence suggests that consumer information and
rationality in these insurance markets is limited because of the
complexity of insurance, the small number of consumers that
experience the most important features of insurance policies, the
profit motives of agents and brokers, and the cognitive limitations
of consumers. Finally, Part I.C claims that these market limitations
create a potential need for the judicial regulation of property/
casualty insurance: not only are the efficiency consequences of such
market failures significant, but the primary alternative of state
administrative regulation is both inherently and practically limited.
A. Insurance Policies and the Efficiency of Standard-form
Contracts
The standard-form contracts that insurers use are unique. Unlike
any other standardized contract, insurance policies are collectively
drafted by competing firms and, as a practical matter, must be used
by all but the largest market participants. The insurance policies
themselves are comprised of simple base policies that can be
supplemented with numerous "endorsements."4 9 Prices for these
insurance policies, although not collectively set, are frequently
subject to heavy state regulation.5' Moreover, these contracts
describe an immense set of potential future circumstances, classifying unknown and unknowable events into different categories.5 1
Finally, the costs to insurers of changing policy terms are particularly significant.5 2 Standing alone, each of these unique characteristics of insurance policy drafting might have only a small effect on
the capacity of market mechanisms to ensure efficient standardized
terms. Nevertheless, when taken together they create significant
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reason to believe that comparatively small levels of imperfect
consumer behavior can lead to inefficient policy terms.
First, the collective process through which many insurance
policies are initially drafted can stunt the competitive forces that
promote efficient contract terms in other markets involving
standard-form contracts. In most consumer-oriented property/
casualty insurance markets, virtually all insurers offer policies that
are drafted by the Insurance Services Organization (ISO)."3 Each
year the ISO drafts a small handful of "base policies" for each
insurance line, as well as hundreds of endorsements that can be
added to the base policies in order to customize coverage.5 4 Use of
these standardized forms is practically a necessity for most insurers
because they result in substantial savings on drafting costs,
regulatory compliance, and the collection and analysis of actuarial
data. Finding property/casualty insurers who offer policies that
substantially deviate from ISO forms is therefore often difficult, if
not impossible. 5
This noncompetitive, collective drafting process means that
comparatively small deviations from ideal market conditions may
lead to inefficient policy terms. Although insurers can choose among
various ISO forms and endorsements to offer to consumers, none of
this variation in contract language is the result of competitive
processes.5 6 Rather, the various base forms and endorsements are
53. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., ISO: ENHANCING COMPETITION IN THE WORLD'S
INSURANCE MARKETS (1997), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-34 (3d ed. 2000). Because insurers are substantially
exempt from federal antitrust laws, they are allowed to collaborate with each other to draft
standard coverage language. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013 (2000).
54. For instance, in 1998 the ISO maintained 5 basic homeowner's policies, with 73
country-wide endorsements and 118 state-specific endorsements. It also maintained 11 basic
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies, with 147 country-wide endorsements. INS.
SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 53, at 34; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764,772 (1993) (describing role of ISO in drafting standard Commercial General Liability
insurance policies).
55. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 53, at 33 ("A very substantial percentage of
the standard-form policies that the [property/casualty] industry uses are prepared by the
Insurance Services Office.").
56. Much literature in economics and business journals discusses the competitiveness
of property/casualty insurance markets. See, e.g., J. David Cummins, Property-Liability
Insurance Price Deregulation: The Last Bastion?, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY
INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 1, 2-4 (J.David

Cummins ed., 2002) (explaining that deregulation of property/casualty insurance could benefit
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analogous to differentiated products offered by a single monopolist.
If consumers are perfectly informed and rational, then this
monopoly-like drafting of insurance policy terms should not impact
the efficiency of those terms: even a monopolist will find it profitable
to offer efficient contract terms and extract consumer surplus
through monopoly pricing.5" But, when some nontrivial percentage
of consumers is not perfectly responsive to insurance policy terms,
collectivized policy drafting exacerbates the risk of inefficient
terms.5 8 In these circumstances, informed and rational consumers
faced with inefficient coverage provisions may not have the option
of going to a competing insurer to find different and better coverage.
Consequently, the only way these consumers can "punish" insurers
for using inefficient terms is to drop out of the market for insurance
altogether. This result stands in stark contrast to a competitive
drafting market: when competitors can easily offer different
standard forms, a firm that uses inefficient standard contracts risks
losing all of the business of informed and rational consumers to a
competitor that offers more efficient terms.59
consumers because "the insurance industry is competitive"); Paul L. Joskow, Cartels,
Competition, and Regulation in the Property-LiabilityInsuranceIndustry, 4 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 375, 375 (1973). This literature, however, suggests only that there is significant
competition in the industry on price, not on policy language. See Michelle E. Boardman,
Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1113-14,
1117 (2006). Indeed, the insurance industry itself acknowledges that essentially no
competition exists within the industry on contract terms, contending that this lack of
competition as to policy language is actually what facilitates price competition in the first
place. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 53, at 33 ("With most insurers offering policies
based on standard ISO language, insurance consumers can readily compare their options,
based on price, coverage, service. By contrast, if standardized coverages did not exist,
consumers would face an unintelligible array of different insurance forms.").
57. See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1053, 1071 (1977); A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 417, 417 (1975). That insurers would ultimately compete on price does
not alter this conclusion, because insurers will profit most from offering efficiently designed
products when consumers are fully responsive, even with price competition. Cf. Fischer, supra
note 16, at 1054-56 (arguing that the sharing of actuarial data among insurers retards
competition and leads insurers to provide less coverage than if each insurer had to compete
separately for information).
58. Recent empirical research does suggest that, in the context of software license
agreements, the quality of standard-form terms is generally independent of market structure.
See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 43, at 5. However, the research does not directly test
whether this result applies in the case of monopoly markets.
59. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 20, at 1398-99. The percentage of consumers that
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Indeed, the risks posed by monopoly standard-form drafting may
be particularly severe in many insurance markets. Even in monopolistic drafting environments, the risk that informed and rational
consumers will choose to entirely forego purchasing a good that is
associated with an unfair standardized contract can effectively
dissuade the use of inefficient contract terms. But in the case of
many consumer insurance policies, most informed and rational
consumers are likely to find the prospect of going entirely without
insurance to be virtually impossible. Indeed, one cannot generally
drive a car or acquire a mortgage without insurance.' Moreover,
unlike large corporations, most consumers do not have the capacity
to substitute from traditional insurance to alternative risk transfer
devices, such as catastrophe bonds or self-insurance. As such, when
insurance policies are exploitive the only practical option available
to such responsive consumers will be to purchase policies with
higher deductibles or to not purchase optional coverage such as
collision insurance. These consumers, in general, will not choose to
entirely forego purchasing insurance, as they might in a market
with standard forms that are genuinely optional.
A second unique feature of insurance that may create a particularly significant risk of inefficient terms is insurers' use of policy
endorsements. 6 Regardless of the level of drafting competition,
informed and rational insurance consumers can deter a firm's use
of exploitive terms only when firms are unable to identify these
consumers ex ante and offer them different contract terms.6 2 When
firms can identify responsive consumers in this way, their profitmaximizing strategy will be to offer these consumers efficient
must be responsive in order for manufacturers to offer efficient contract terms depends on
various market specifics, including (1) the cost savings to the firm of the inefficient term, and
(2) the amount of profit that firms make on informed consumers given efficient terms. See R.
Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother'sKeeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority
To Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 675 (1996). Depending on these
variables, Cruz and Hinck have suggested that the percentage could range from one to ninety
percent. Id.
60. See JERRY, supra note 23, §§ 53A, 133.
61. But see Michael B. Rappaport, TheAmbiguity Rule and InsuranceLaw: Why Insurance
Contracts Should Not Be ConstruedAgainst the Drafter,30 GA. L. REV. 171,242 n.194 (1995)
(arguing that insurers have a particularly difficult time distinguishing between informed and
uninformed consumers because of the uniform standard-form contract).
62. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 59, at 674-75.
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contract terms, but to offer unresponsive consumers inefficient,
exploitive contract terms. 3 The unresponsive consumers will accept
the exploitive contract without demanding a corresponding decrease
in price, whereas responsive consumers will not go to competitors or
forego purchasing the associated good because efficient terms are
available to them.64
Insurers may be able to segment their consumers in this way
through the common practice of offering a small number of base
policies with a wide array of supplementary endorsement options.65
Because responsive consumers are by assumption knowledgeable
about policy terms, they will choose endorsements that eliminate
inefficiently one-sided exclusions. By offering exploitive coverage in
the standard base policy, but then providing efficient coverage in
alternative base policies or endorsements, insurers can conceivably
discriminate between responsive and unresponsive consumers. For
one potential example of this phenomenon, consider the prominent
case Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 66 In Atwood, a

self-employed electrician was sued after failing to repair a thermostat, which caused a child to die of heat exposure. 7 The electrician's
insurance policy unambiguously excluded coverage for liabilities
resulting from "completed operations," and the child's death clearly
occurred after the electrician had finished working on the thermostat.68 Nonetheless, the Atwood court held that the electrician's
liability insurer was obligated to cover the loss. 69 One explanation

for this seemingly puzzling result is that the exclusion limited
coverage in a way that the market did not check, because informed
consumers could simply purchase supplemental coverage that filled
63. Cf. Rappaport, supra note 61, at 242 (noting that "[s]ellers that use harsh terms lose
more to comparison shoppers who purchase elsewhere than they benefit from the uninformed
customers who buy contracts with harsh terms" because of the seller's inability to
differentiate between responsive and unresponsive consumers).
64. Id.
65. Even if endorsements do create the risk of discrimination between informed and
uninformed consumers, they are nonetheless justified because they facilitate the provision of
coverage that matches individuals' risk preferences.
66. 365 A.2d 744 (N.H. 1976).
67. Id. at 745.
68. See id. at 745-46.
69. The court held that the exclusion was not applicable because it was buried in the
policy's fine print and not within the insured's reasonable expectations. Id. at 746-47.
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this gap. Indeed, although the standard commercial liability policies
of the time included the "completed operations clause," knowledgeable consumers could easily bypass the exclusion by purchasing a
widely available endorsement. v Many informed insureds purchased
this coverage, which protected them from the most significant
emerging risks they faced as professionals.7 1
A third unique element of insurance markets that may exacerbate
the risk of inefficient policy terms is the prevalence of price
regulation in many consumer insurance markets. Although states
have increasingly allowed free market forces to set insurance prices,
a large number of states regulate the prices of automobile and
homeowners insurance.7 2 Historically, this rate regulation was
primarily intended to ensure that insurance rates were adequate
and insurers remained solvent.73 Today, however, rate regulation is
also intended to prevent insurers in noncompetitive markets
from charging supracompetitive prices for their policies.7 4 One
unintended consequence of this regulation, though, is that insurers
in noncompetitive markets may favor nonprice methods, such as
unfairly using one-sided policies, to extract consumer surplus.7 5
Although insurers will generally prefer to exploit their market
power through the use of monopoly pricing,7 6 the existence of price
regulation may cause insurers to resort to the second-best solution
of offering one-sided terms in order to extract supra-competitive
profits.
Price regulation may also lead to inefficient insurance policies
even in naturally competitive markets if state regulators cause
70. See Roger C. Henderson, InsuranceProtection for Products Liability and Completed
Operations-WhatEvery Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 418 (1971).
71. Id. at 416-18.
72. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 125. Almost all states regulate the price of automobile
insurance, and many regulate the prices of homeowners insurance and workers' compensation
insurance. See id. Most state insurance regulators must either approve rates before they are
charged (in prior-approval states) or shortly after they are used in the market (in prior-use
states). See Cummins, supra note 56, at 3.
73. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 125.
74. Id.
75. The strength of this objection is tempered by the fact that most lines of
property/casualty insurance tend to be sold in markets that are naturally competitive on
price. See supra note 56.
76. See Spence, supra note 57, at 417.
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insurers to charge subcompetitive rates for their policies. 7 Insurers
have often complained that state regulators artificially cap policy
prices below the rate that is justified by unrealized risks.7 8 Because
the price of insurance is uniquely visible, there is reason to believe
that state regulators face political incentives to keep insurance
policy rates lower than they ought to be. Indeed, many public
insurance programs, such as Federal Flood Insurance and residual
hurricane coverage in Florida, have chronically charged insufficient
premiums, leading to massive shortfalls in revenues.79
A fourth reason that insurance contracts may tend to be inefficient is that more opportunities for inefficiencies are present in the
insurance context than in most contractual settings. Unlike most
contracts, which typically concern a discrete set of issues surrounding a particular transaction or event, insurance policies categorize
and assign results to the entire universe of potential risks that
insureds of all different types face. To do so, insurance policies must
frequently rely on abstract and generalizable language, such as
"occurrences," "related acts," "wear and tear," and the like.8" Not
only do these terms create a unique potential for ambiguity, 81 but
they also create the unique potential for ostensibly unambiguous
but inefficient results. Courts often find that the sheer breadth of an
insurance policy term makes its application to a particular set of
facts unambiguous from a linguistic standpoint, even when that
result was clearly never contemplated by the drafters and may not,
therefore, make economic sense." Although this type of gap between
77. If the reason that insurers offer inefficient terms is overly aggressive price regulation,
then the wisdom of forcing insurers to offer efficient terms may be unclear.
78. See, e.g., State Farm Makes Legal Challenges to Texas' Rejection of Rate Increase,
BESTWIRE, Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.ambest.com (describing frequent conflicts between state
regulators and homeowners insurers who are denied requested rate increases).
79. See, e.g., Christopher Drew & Joseph B. Treaster, PoliticsStalls Plan To Bolster Flood
Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at Al.
80. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 53, at 165-86 (sample homeowners policy).
81. See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 299-301; Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277,279-83 (Peter Newman ed.,

1998). For an excellent review of this issue, see Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance
Policy Interpretation,95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 547-50 (1996).
82. For a good example of this phenomenon, consider the "related acts" provisions that are
commonly found in liability insurance policies, and that treat as a single claim all claims that
arise out of "related acts" or a "series of related acts." In deciding what this clause means,
some courts have defined the word "related" according to its "ordinary" or "common" meaning.
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linguistic meaning and intent may occur in any contract, the
peculiar extent to which insurance policies must use vague and
general terms means that it is significantly more likely to occur in
insurance policies.
Finally, insurers may tend to rely on inefficient policy terms
because they directly bear the costs of redrafting policy language,
which are often quite large. One of the significant benefits to
insurers of uniform and consistent policy language is that it is
repeatedly interpreted by courts, leading to each term having a rich
meaning that, like a statute, begins with the language of the
contract but extends into the case law. 3 This effect is enhanced in
insurance markets, as repeated judicial interpretation of boilerplate
allows insurers to learn not only about the meaning of those terms,
but also about the actuarial ramifications of these meanings.'
Moreover, such predictability is particularly important for insurers
because it allows them to reduce the amount of capital they must
keep accessible to pay for losses during a particularly high period of
insured losses.85 These benefits of static policy language may
counsel in favor of retaining otherwise inefficient policy terms, at
least for some period of time. But insurers may tend to cling to
historical terms beyond that point: whereas the social costs of
outdated policy language are at least partially borne by consumers,
the benefits of such language flow directly to insurers. Indeed,
The question of ambiguity under this approach is then determined by asking whether, in the
specific case at hand, it is ambiguous if the acts in question are "related." See, e.g., Cont'l Cas.
Co. v. Wendt, 205 F.3d 1258 app. at 1262-63 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (indicating that the
"Court can see no ambiguity when applying the language of the policy to the facts of this
case'); Gregory v. Home Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 602, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1989) (allowing a broad
definition of "related"); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Brooks, 698 So.2d 763, 764-65 (Ala. 1997) (per
curiam). This approach can potentially lead courts to find that two events are unambiguously
"related" under the meaning of the policy, even when this result is contrary to the clause's
purpose.
83. See Boardman, supra note 56, at 1110-11; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardizationand Innovation in CorporateContracting(or "The Economicsof Boilerplate'),
83 VA. L. REv. 713, 718 (1997).
84. Boardman, supra note 56, at 1114.
85. See ABRAHAM, supranote 53, at 2; see also Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns:
The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 784 (2005). Insurers must incur
significant accounting and tax costs in order to keep large amounts of capital liquid. See
Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and
UninsurableRisks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 208 (1997).
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commentators have frequently noted that "[i]nsurers will cling for
decades to language that courts continually declare ambiguous.""
B. Consumer Information and Rationality in Property/Casualty
InsuranceMarkets

The arguments developed in Part L.A suggest that there are
unique risks in many insurance markets that relatively small levels
of consumer ignorance or irrationality can lead to inefficient policy
terms. To the extent that insurance consumers are perfectly
informed and rational, however, these arguments are unavailing.87
But the available evidence suggests that insureds' information and
rationality are very limited in many consumer-oriented property/casualty insurance markets.
1. The Assumption of Consumer Knowledge

The actual market mechanisms by which property/casualty
insurance consumers become "informed" about policy terms have
virtually nothing to do with insureds reading policy terms.'
Instead, the empirical evidence suggests that consumers learn about
policy terms through (a) reputation effects, (b) insurance information intermediaries, and (c) secondary literature. Each of these
sources filters information about policy terms, condensing and
repackaging it into a form that consumers can easily understand. At

86. Boardman, supra note 56, at 1106.
87. For this reason, even though many of the structural limits described above apply to
insurance markets that are geared towards sophisticated commercial purchasers, these
markets may not suffer from significant inefficiencies in policy language. See supra note 48.
88. See JERRY, supra note 23, § 32[b] ("In forming a contract, an insured relies not upon
the text of the policies but on the general descriptions of the coverage provided by the insurer
and its agents during the time the insured was considering whether to submit an
application."); Rakoff, supranote 38, at 1179 ("Mhe adhering party is in practice unlikely to
have read the standard terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have understood
them if he has read them."). Even if insureds wanted to learn directly about the scope of
potential coverage, they might find doing so a difficult task: insureds generally do not receive
the policy itself until after they have agreed to purchase their insurance. See JERRY, supra
note 23, § 32[b]. Some lines of insurance allow the insured to cancel coverage shortly after
receiving the contract. See MURIEL L. CRAWFORD, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT
174 (7th ed. 1994).
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the same time, these informational sources are limited in their
capacity to convey nuanced policy information to consumers.
a. Reputation
Insurance consumers rely heavily on the reputation of insurers
when deciding whether, and from whom, to purchase insurance.89
Discussions with family and friends are the leading source of such
information. One 1995 study found that 51% of homeowner insureds
and 54% of auto insureds relied on word of mouth to learn about
insurance, eclipsing all other sources of information. 9 A more recent
2001 study found that 56% of recent consumers relied on information from someone they knew when buying auto insurance and 98%
of those consumers considered this information somewhat or very
valuable.91 Again, no other source of information was as frequently
cited by insureds as a basis upon which they made their insurancepurchasing decision.92 Other popular sources for learning about
insurance are closely tied to insurers' reputations: insurance
shoppers look to (1) insurance company advertisements (23% among
recent automobile insurance purchasers), (2) television (10%), and
(3) the yellow pages (14%). 3 Reputation affects repeat purchasers'
decision making as well: ignoring price shifts, people tend to stay
with an insurer when they are happy with the coverage they have
received.94
89. For a general discussion of the role of reputation in disciplining sellers' contracting
behavior, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance,89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). On the limits of reputation, see Oliver
E. Williamson, Economic Institutions:Spontaneous and IntentionalGovernance, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 159, 166-72 (1991).
90. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An InterdisciplinaryCritiqueof the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 311 (1998-99) (citing INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC
ATTITUDE MONITOR 15 fig.2-7, 31 fig.2-27 (1995) [hereinafter PAM 1995]).
91. INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, ISSUE 2, at 6 fig.2-5
[hereinafter PAM 2001].
92. See id.
93. See id. Insurers' costly investments in advertising can be understood to enhance
reputation by signaling to consumers their confidence in their products. See Paul Milgrom &
John Roberts, Price andAdvertising Signals of ProductQuality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986);
Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 732 (1974).
94. See INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2000, ISSUE 2, at 5 fig.2-3
(reporting that only 7% of homeowners or renters changed insurers in the last 5 years, but
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Reputation, however, has limitations as a mechanism for
transmitting information about insurance coverage to consumers.
Reputation is largely a function of consumer satisfaction, which
studies suggest is based primarily on consumers' perceptions of
insurers' reliability.9" Unlike virtually any other product, the most
important element of insurance policies-the protection they
provide against low-probability, high-cost losses96 is also an
element that only a few insureds actually use or experience.97
Consequently, most insureds can personally judge their insurer's
reliability only when it comes to relatively small claims, such as a
broken windshield or a fallen tree. Consumers who assess insurers'
reputations based on the advice of friends and family, or on their
own past insurance experiences, may therefore get a skewed
perspective on the scope of their insurance coverage that unduly
takes into account insurers' responsiveness to relatively unimportant, inexpensive claims."s
The initial evidence suggests that reputation in insurance
markets may be limited in this way. First, as noted above, consumers do indeed tend to rely on the experiences of friends and family
in assessing insurers' reputations.99 By contrast, the evidence
suggests that only a small percentage of consumers consult either
consumer-oriented magazines or state government websites that
post complaints of aggrieved insurance consumers.' 0 Even more
notably, consumers that did consult these sources found them less
useful than advice from friends and family.' 0 ' Second, the prospect
23% of auto insureds did). When consumers do change insurers, they overwhelmingly cite
price as the reason. See id. at 6 fig.2-4.
95. See Maria Royne Stafford et al., Determinantsof Service Quality and Satisfaction in
the Auto Casualty Claims Process, 12 J. SERVS. MKTG. 426, 434 (1998).
96. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
97. Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability
Events: Policy Implications,8 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 566 (1989).
98. Sec Rappaport, supra note 61, at 242 & n.196.
99. See Thomas, supranote 90, at 311.
100. Only 6% of recent insureds report learning about insurance through the state
government, and only 10% report consulting a consumer organization magazine. See PAM
2001, supra note 91, at 6 fig.2-5.
101. Eighty-three percent of consumers found public information helpful, which was
substantially lower than the percent that found consulting with friends and family to be
helpful. See id. Although the percentage finding consumer magazines helpful was higher, at
92%, it did not approach the 98% level of information from friends and family. Id.

20071

A PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY

1415

that insurers' reputations disproportionately track coverage for
small losses helps to explain the otherwise puzzling fact that
insurance policies often cover small losses, such as broken car
windshields or storm damage to trees, shrubs, and plants. Rational
consumers, one would expect, would not demand such coverage
given the trivial risks these losses present and the comparative size
of the administrative costs insurers incur when paying for these
losses. But if consumers disproportionately rely on insurers'
coverage of common losses to assess reputation, then insurers can
improve their general reputation by providing this relatively cheap
coverage.
Finally, the potential that insurers' reputations unduly track
coverage for high-probability, low-cost losses also helps to explain
the "big claims" exclusion in insurance law.1 °2 In a number of
different business insurance lines, commentators have observed
that insurers tend disproportionately to fight large claims.'o 3 In the
cases of liability from pollution and asbestos, for instance, the
administrative costs of disputes have often outweighed the total
amount that insurers paid in compensation.' 0 4 Although commentators have focused on business insurance contexts when discussing
this "big-claim" exclusion,'
anecdotal evidence suggests that
consumer-oriented property/casualty insurers also disproportionately fight big claims.'0 6 To the extent this evidence is correct, it is
consistent with a perception among insurers that their reputations
insufficiently reflect their willingness to pay big claims.
b. Insurance Information Intermediaries
A second common source of information for consumers in the
property/casualty industry is information intermediaries, such as
insurance agents or brokers.' 7 Other than family and friends, such
102. Abraham, supra note 15, at 213.
103. See id.; Richard E. Stewart & Barbara D. Stewart, The Loss of the Certainty Effect, 4
RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 29,33 (2001) ("From an insurer's point of view, resisting large claims
has become an effective, perhaps even necessary, competitive strategy.").
104. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 103, at 33.
105. Abraham, supra note 15, at 213.
106. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 103, at 40-42.
107. The average consumer "depends on an insurance agent and insurance company to sell
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intermediaries are most commonly mentioned as a source from
which consumers initially learned about insurance; in 1995, for
example, 45% of insured homeowners and 42% of insured drivers
relied on information from an insurance agent or broker.'0 8 In 2001,
40% of consumers relied on insurance agents to learn about
automobile insurance. °9
Insurance information intermediaries are likely to do a good,
though imperfect, job of informing consumers about basic coverage
exclusions and available potential endorsements. The unique
advantage of these information sources is that they help assess a
consumer's individual need for insurance and explain coverage
options appropriate to that individual. 1 ° In doing so, they filter out
the most relevant information about different policy options and
answer consumers' basic questions. For these reasons, most
insurance consumers report being satisfied with the information
they learn from these sources: more than 90% of insurance consumers rated the information they learned from insurance agents or
brokers as somewhat or very helpful."'
Although insurance information intermediaries greatly improve
consumer information, they do not eliminate all deficiencies in
consumer knowledge. First, information intermediaries generally
tend to focus on basic coverage terms and avoid coverage nuances
that cannot be altered with supplemental coverage: insurance
agents and brokers are only trained to know about basic coverage
information and matters that potentially require consumer decision
making."' Second, both insurance agents and insurance brokers

him a policy that 'works' for its intended purpose in much the same way that he depends on
a television salesman and television manufacturer." Slawson, supra note 29, at 547. Insurance
information intermediaries also include banks. Although only 8% of respondents relied on
banks to learn about insurance in 2001, PAM 2001, supra note 91, at 6 fig.2-5, their
importance has likely increased significantly in recent years as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
which allows banks to sell insurance, was passed only in 1999. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
108. See Thomas, supranote 90, at 311-12 (citing PAM 1995, at 15 fig.2-7, 31, fig.2-27).
109. See PAM 2001, supra note 91, at 6 fig.2-5.
110. See ABRAHAM, supra note 53, at 56.
111. See Thomas, supra note 90, at 312 (citing PAM 1995, at 15 fig.2-7, 31, fig.2-27).
112. See R.D. Blanchard, An InsuranceAgent's Legal Duties to Customers, 21 HAMLINE L.
REv. 9, 9-10 (1997). Understanding more detailed nuances of coverage will often require legal
expertise.
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have a strong incentive to sell insurance to consumers."' They
therefore have a tendency to focus on the positive elements of
coverage, telling "stories" that, while technically accurate, gloss over
1 4
many of the less salient ways in which a policy limits coverage.
Insurance information intermediaries will also fail to protect the
interests of consumers that purchase insurance from direct
underwriters, who sell policies directly to consumers. ' Consumers
who bypass information intermediaries almost universally purchase
their policies through particularly large insurers, such as Allstate,
Nationwide, State Farm, and GEICO."' These megainsurers are
also the insurers most likely to deviate from standard ISO policy
language: because these large insurers have enough policyholders
to generate accurate actuarial predictions using only their own loss
experiences, they do not need to rely on the aggregate industry data
maintained by the ISO." ' For this reason, they also do not need to
113. Insurance agents owe their primary allegiance to the insurer. See Robert H. Jerry, II
& Reginald L. Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the Negotiation of Insurance Agent
Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under State Constitutions, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
773, 773 (1990). Insurance brokers, at least ostensibly, solely represent the consumer. But as
a recent Eliot Spitzer lawsuit revealed, in practice most brokers nonetheless have significant
loyalties to insurers as well. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure:The Case for
Banning Contingent Commissions and other Insurer-Paid Bonuses for Independent
Intermediaries, 25 YALE L. & POL. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that contingent
commissions, which are essentially bonuses that insurers pay to brokers and independent
agents for bringing the insurer a particularly large volume of profitable customers, have the
potential to distort the advice that ostensibly independent insurance intermediaries give to
their customers).
114. See Tom Baker, Constructingthe InsuranceRelationship:SalesStories, ClaimsStories,
and Insurance Contract Damages,72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1400-16 (1994).
115. Direct underwriters should be contrasted with insurers who use exclusive agents.
Some agents are independent and sell policies from multiple different insurers, whereas
others are exclusive and sell only one insurer's policies. See Laureen Regan & Sharon
Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of InsuranceMarketing System, 39 J.L. & ECON.
637 (1996). In either case, the insured receives expert advice about the scope of coverage. But
see Dana A. Kerr, UnderstandingBasis Risk in InsuranceContracts,9 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV.
37, 50 (2006) (raising the question whether consumer coverage expectations may be more
accurate when they purchase from independent agents rather than direct agents); Schwarcz,
supra note 113. In the case of direct underwriters, by contrast, there is no insurance agent;
the consumer merely purchases the insurance online or over the phone.
116. See ABRAHAM, supra note 53, at 56.
117. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 47. One example of this phenomenon is State Farm's
unique "lead in" clause in homeowner's policies, which excludes coverage whenever an
excluded risk contributes in any way to a loss. See Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509
S.E.2d 1, 13 (W. Va. 1998). Under this exclusion, which reverses the traditional efficient-
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use the standard-form language from which the aggregate data is
derived. Consumers who purchase insurance from direct underwriters therefore potentially purchase a substantively different policy
from that which is offered by most insurers and forego the advice of
an information intermediary about these differences. For these
reasons, their interests may not be protected at all by informed
consumers who rely on an information intermediary to purchase
insurance."'
Insurance information intermediaries that also lend to clients on
a secured basis-such as banks or other mortgage providers that
require homeowners insurance' -may provide an additional
measure of protection to consumers who rely on them. 20 Unlike
other information intermediates, these lenders have a direct stake
in the substantive scope of policy language because it protects their
collateral. But even these intermediaries will imperfectly steer
consumers to efficient coverage. First, the interests of lenders and
consumers may not be perfectly aligned: lenders care about
protecting collateral only to the extent that the collateral secures a
loan. Because the value of an insured asset typically exceeds the
loan amount, lenders will tend to care about a narrower band of
coverage issues than insureds. Second, lenders may protect their
interests primarily by negotiating ex post resolutions of coverage
disputes that are favorable to them, but not necessarily the
consumer.' 2 ' Unlike consumers, banks and other lenders are repeat
players that have established relationships with insurance adjustors, facilitating this type of ex post negotiation. 22 To the extent
proximate-cause rule, State Farm has consistently argued that it has no obligation to cover
any losses that are in any way caused by "earth movement," a traditionally excluded risk. See
id.
118. This concern may be offset by the fact that the standard policy argument made in
supratext accompanying notes 52-59 is not applicable in this case, as informed consumers can
receive the coverage they desire.
119. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
120. At least in 2001, surprisingly few consumers relied on lending institutions to help
advise them about the purchase of insurance. See supra note 107 (only 8% of survey
respondents relied upon banks to learn about insurance in 2001).
121. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-formContractsEnable CooperativeNegotiationBetween Businessesand Consumers,

104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 864-76 (2006) (describing a number of situations in which firms grant
their agents authority to extend the benefits of standard-form contracts ex post).
122. See id. at 881-84 (explaining that a firm's willingness to award discretionary ex-post
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that lenders can protect their interests through this ex post
strategy, they will have insufficient incentives to steer insureds to
efficient coverage ex ante.
c. Secondary Literature
A final source on which insurance consumers heavily rely is
secondary materials written either by the insurance industry or by
consumer advocacy groups.'2 3 In 2001, 21% of recent insurance
shoppers relied on insurance company literature and 10% relied on
consumer information magazines.'2 4 Insurance regulators also
provide consumers with educational publications
and services such
1 25
as a consumer hotline and on-site seminars.
Although these information sources are reportedly helpful to
consumers,'2 6 they are also limited. Unlike insurance information
intermediaries, they do not provide individualized information to
insurance consumers. Because written literature must be accessible
and relevant to a wide range of readers, it can explain only the most
basic coverage exclusions and endorsement options. And, of course,
insurers, like agents and brokers, ultimately profit from selling
more insurance. At the margins, therefore, they have an incentive
either to not disclose coverage limitations in secondary literature or
to do so in the way that makes the limitations most palatable to

consumers. 127

benefits to a customer will depend on the extent to which that customer is a repeat player).
123. See Rappaport, supra note 61, at 240 n.187 (noting that "[b]rochures and summaries
have been neglected as a means of informing consumers about the terms of their form
contracts").
124. See PAM 2001, supranote 91, at 6 fig.2-5.
125. Brenda P. Wells & Maria Royne Stafford, Insurance Education Efforts and Insurer
Service Quality, 15 J. INS. REG. 540, 540-41 (1997).
126. PAM 2001, supra note 91, at 6 fig.2-5 (finding that 92% of consumers rate insurance
company literature to be somewhat or very helpful and 97% rate consumer organization
magazines to be somewhat or very helpful).
127. See Rappaport, supra note 61, at 240 n.187 ("One significant problem with brochures
and sales materials ... [is] that they may be misleading.").
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2. The Assumption of Consumer Rationality
Even when insurance consumers do learn about a policy term,
they may irrationally discount it when deciding whether to purchase
insurance. A growing body of research suggests that consumers
irrationally tend to disregard nonsalient terms in ordinary
standard-form contracts, even if they are informed about those
terms.1 2 The reason is that consumers are boundedly rational; in
this case, they are only capable of incorporating a limited number
of considerations into their purchasing decisions.'2 9 Whether
consumers will tend to consider a contract term in their decision
making is often determined by basic heuristics that do not necessarily identify the most important terms."3 Consumers, for instance,
may focus on a term involving an issue that has recently been
131
discussed in the news, even if the term is relatively unimportant.
Firms that can identify nonsalient terms will have132an incentive to
draft them so that they are inefficiently one-sided.
In the insurance context, contract terms that govern low probability risks may be particularly likely to be nonsalient for many
consumers. All else being equal, insurance consumers tend to
"refuse to attend to or worry about events whose probability is below
some threshold," no matter how high the expected cost of such an

128. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240-44 (1995); Robert A. HiUman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision
Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 721
(2000); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 451; Korobkin, supra note 45, at 1217-18;
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete
Contracts,Bounded Rationality,and Market Failure,85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1999).
129. David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure,59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277,300 (1986) (finding that psychological literature
suggests "the number of salient or determinate product attributes ... does not exceed five, and
often is less"); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 451 ("[Consumers] rely on casually
acquired, partial information, sufficient to make them comfortable with their choice .... [and]
are therefore unlikely even to consider whether the assessment of the remote risks described
in boilerplate terms is important to their decision to enter into a contract.").
130. See Korobkin, supra note 45, at 1223.
131. See Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1518-22 (1998) (discussing the potential importance of availability in determining
what issues consumers focus on in decision-making processes).
132. See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem, supra note 47, at 745-49 (arguing that
manufacturers have a natural incentive to exploit consumers' cognitive biases).
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accident.' Thus, various laboratory investigations have found that
individuals consistently prefer to insure against high-probability,
low-cost events. 114 This observed behavior contrasts sharply with the
expected utility model of insurance, which predicts that insureds
will generally prefer to insure against low-probability, high-cost
events over high-probability, low-cost events, if the expected loss
and premium are kept constant. 3' Field evidence similarly suggests
that people tend simply to ignore seemingly improbable risks. In one
classic study of insurance, for instance, interviewers surveyed
people living in hazard-prone areas in California about their
attitudes towards insurance.'3 6 The study revealed that, though
many homeowners living in these areas were aware that they faced
potentially large liabilities in the event of a flood or an earthquake,
remarkably few of them had invested even minimal effort in
learning about available insurance options.'3 7 Even those who were
aware of the likelihood of these risks tended not to insure against
them, despite having purchased ordinary homeowners insurance. 3 '

133. HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
236 (1978); see also RISA PALM, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF
CALIFORNIA HOMEOWNERS 5-6 (1995); Jolls et al., supra note 131, at 1518-19; Paul Slovic et
al., Preferencefor InsuringAgainst ProbableSmall Losses: Insurance Implications, in THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK 51, 67-68 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000); Mark J. Machina, Choice Under
Uncertainty:Problems Solved and Unsolved, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (1987). Countervailing
factors may lead insurance consumers to focus too much on low-probability risks. For
instance, a risk may be exaggerated if it has recently occurred (availability heuristic), or
figured prominently in media coverage (social amplification of risk). See PALM, supra.
134. One well-known study simulated an insurance decision by having subjects choose a
red or blue ball from an urn. See Slovic et al., supra note 133, at 54-57. The blue ball
represented a hazard against which study participants could insure; by varying the ratio of
colored balls, experimenters could manipulate the probability of loss. Id. Contrary to expected
utility theory, "a strong preference was found for insuring against high-probability, low-cost
events." Id. at 56. This result was consistent among different populations and was replicated
in a number of different experimental designs. Id. at 62-67.
135. See Slovic et al., supra note 133, at 52-53. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944).
136. KUNREUTHER, supra note 133, at 236.
137. Id. at 236-43. People's expectations of federal aid in the event of a natural disaster did
not explain these findings, as most reported that they did not anticipate relying on such aid.
Id. at 237-38.
138. Evidence from a 1993 study in California supports these results: objective factors, such
as proximity to a fault line, had little to do with whether a homeowner purchased earthquake
insurance. PALM, supra note 133, at 75-78.
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Observation therefore suggests that insurance decision making
is typically a sequential process: most insurance consumers first
decide whether a potential loss is a "problem"; then, if and only if it
is, do they consider insurance." 9 As such, insurers may face
insufficient market pressure to draft efficient terms when those
terms govern sufficiently low probability events. Yet this is precisely
when adequate insurance coverage is most valuable. More generally, if cognitive limitations such as consumers' sequential approach
to insurance are widespread, insurers may be able to determine by
research and experience which coverage exclusions insureds will
ignore or overlook, and then use this information to selectively draft
inefficiently one-sided terms. 4 °
C. A Role for JudicialIntervention
The evidence and analysis discussed above suggests that
imperfections in many consumer-oriented property/casualty
insurance markets may lead to inefficient policies. Of course, the
mere existence of market problems does not necessarily warrant
government intervention, which is itself both costly and imperfect.
But the social welfare consequences of failures in insurance markets
are sufficiently large that such intervention may be optimal.' And
while state insurance regulators can and do review the substance of
policy terms,'42 effective regulation of insurance policies also
requires the ex post examination of policy terms in light of their
specific applications to insureds' losses. The judiciary has an obvious
comparative advantage to regulators in performing this function,
particular risks of agency capture in the
especially given the
143
insurance context.

139. See KUNREUTHER, supra note 133, at 241; see also Slovic et al., supra note 133, at 5657 (endorsing sequential model of insurance decision making).
140. See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem, supra note 47, at 747-49.
141. Whether this is true, of course, depends on the costs and reliability of judicial
intervention. See infra Part III.C.
142. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
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1. The Social Welfare Consequences of Inefficient Coverage
When insurers do use exploitive terms or insufficient care in
drafting, the negative effects on social welfare are often significantly
larger than in the case of other types of inefficiently drafted
standard-form contracts. In part, this is because insurers are much
more efficient bearers of the risk of inefficient insurance policy
terms than insureds.'4 4 Insureds who are denied coverage will have
suffered a significant loss and, consequently, be particularly likely
to value coverage.' 4 5 By contrast, because the payment of coverage
by an insurer in any individual case will typically be a small loss
relative to the insurer's net assets, the insurer is not particularly
1 46
harmed by bearing that risk.
A second and related reason why suboptimal insurance coverage
can be particularly inefficient is that wronged "insured[s] ha[ve] no
ability to 'cover"' for the inefficient denial of coverage. 147 Insurance
contracts are distinctive in part because they involve sequential and
contingent performance: the insured performs routinely by paying
premiums, whereas the insurer's performance-paying claims-is
contingent on an event that may not happen. 4 Even among such
aleatory contracts, though, insurance policies are unique because
the insured cannot contract with anyone else for substitute performance if the insurer refuses to perform. 49 Once the insurer denies
an insured's claim, "the policyholder has nowhere else to go."'15 For
this reason, the insured's misguided reliance on insurance coverage
can be particularly damaging.

144. The application of an unexpected exclusion is analogous to a risk from the consumers'
perspective. See Kerr, supra note 115, at 41-43.
145. See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 258 ("Risk aversion is most relevant in situations in
which losses would be large in relation to a person's assets and thus would impinge
substantially on his utility.").
146. Id. at 258-59.
147. Works, supra note 16, at 583 n.185 (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 447 (Del. 1996)).
148. Id. at 578-88; BAKER, supra note 29, at 89.
149. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 89; Works, supra note 16, at 584 n.186.
150. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 89.
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2. The Limitations of State Administrative Regulation
Although the content of insurance policies is generally subject to
state regulatory review, many insurance law commentators assume
that this regulation is perfunctory and ineffective. 5 ' Despite this
widespread sentiment, to date there has been no systematic study
of such regulation.'5 2 Moreover, state regulators' scrutiny of
insurance policies can occasionally be quite substantive. For
instance, Texas insurance regulators engaged in a prolonged debate
with insurers about their proposal to exclude losses from mold in
standard homeowners policies,' 53 and New York regulators refused
to allow many insurers to switch from "occurrence" policies to
"claims-made" policies.' Additionally, the lessons that one state
regulator learns in the process of substantively reviewing policies
can often be shared with regulators from other states through the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).'5 5
Nonetheless, at this point there is not enough evidence to
overcome the presumption that state regulatory review cannot be
relied on to police the substantive content of insurance policies
absent support from the judiciary. State insurance regulators
typically come from within the insurance industry, leading to
potentially significant regulatory capture.' 5 6 This is particularly
151. See id. at 47 (noting that while "[tihere has been no systematic, scholarly study of the
effectiveness of state regulation of insurance forms," most commentators assume that such
regulation is inadequate); Keeton, supra note 8, at 967 ("Regulation is relatively weak in most
instances, and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or administrative
action ordinarily are in essence adoptions, outright or slightly modified, of proposals made by
insurers' draftsmen.").
152. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 47.
153. See Terrence Stutz, Lift Freeze on Policies, Insurers Told; State Regulator Seeks
Solution To Rise in Home Mold Claims, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 31, 2001, at 1A; Mike
W. Thomas, Regulators, Insurers Engaged in Homeowners-policy Showdown, SAN ANTONIO
Bus. J., Nov. 16, 2001, at 1.
154. STEMPEL, supra note 16, at 601.
155. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulationin the United States:RegulatoryFederalism
and the NationalAssociation of Insurance Commissioners,26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 667-70
(1999) (discussing the ways in which the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
allows different states' insurance regulators to impact one another); see also Spencer L.
Kimball, The Casefor State Regulation of Insurance,in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL
POLICY 420 (Spencer L. Kimball & Herbert S. Denenberg eds., 1969) (noting that the NAIC
promotes uniformity).
156. See Randall, supra note 155, at 639-41 (arguing that "the problem of capture as it
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problematic given that insurers generally do not individually submit
policies for review by regulators; rather, the ISO itself "actively
pursue[s] approvals" of its own standard forms.'57 Moreover, state
insurance regulators generally view their primary duty to be
assuring insurer solvency.'5 8 For this reason, their substantive
review of policy terms is not typically a priority.
Even if these practical concerns could be overcome, any regulatory regime capable of combating inefficient policy terms would need
to rely heavily on ex post, as well as ex ante, review. Inefficiencies
in policy terms will frequently be hard to assess ex ante given their
breadth and their potential to apply in a way that regulators may
not be able to anticipate. Moreover, some anecdotal evidence
suggests that regulators may be willing to accept false assurances
from insurers that particularly broad clauses will be enforced only
in limited circumstances.' 5 9 Although there is no theoretical problem
with state administrators reviewing insurance policy content ex
post, the judiciary will typically enjoy a comparative advantage in
this task.
Ultimately, then, state administrative review is not a sufficient
check on the content of insurance policies and must be supplemented with limited judicial oversight if it is to be effective. At the
same time, state regulation ought not to be irrelevant to the judicial
process, especially when regulators have considered ex ante the
precise issues that litigation raises ex post. In fact, a doctrinal
recognition of state insurance regulation may lead regulators to
take a more active role in reviewing policy provisions and encourage
further cooperation among insurers of different states through the
NAIC.
exists in other regulatory contexts is minimal when compared to the problem in the insurance
industry" for various reasons, including that "[tihe industry directly funds the NAIC").
157. Insurance Services Organization, About ISO-Helping Insurers Comply with Legal
and Regulatory Requirements, http:J/www.iso.com/aboutiso/about08.html (last visited Jan.
25, 2007).
158. See Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, Rational Insurance Purchasing:
Considerationof ContractNonperformance, 105 Q.J. ECON. 243, 243 (1990).
159. For example, according to one oft-quoted insurance industry representative, who was
testifying before the Texas Insurance Department, "the language of the [absolute pollution]
exclusion was drafted with unrealistic breadth to ensure its effectiveness," but "it would not
be literally enforced against insured[s] in cases where doing so would be inconsistent with
basic understanding about the policy." Stempel, supra note 18, at 235-36.
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II. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AS A FLAWED DOCTRINE FOR THE
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF INSURANCE

Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton initially proposed the
reasonable expectations rule as a guide for the "judicial regulation
of' insurance policies. 6 ° Keeton's rule requires insurers to provide
the coverage that consumers reasonably expect, at least when the
insurer does not "[call a coverage limitation] to the attention of a
policyholder at the time of contracting, thereby negating surprise to
him."16 ' It thus attempts to correct for consumers' lack of meaningful assent to an adhesive insurance policy by requiring either
explicit consumer assent to a policy term (when the insurer
specifically informs the consumer of a term) or implicit assent to the
term (when the term is within consumers' reasonable expectations). 162
As Part I argues, Keeton's intuition that insurance policies can
' At the same time,
include exploitive terms was, and is, very real. 63
though, Keeton's reasonable expectations solution largely ignores
the key analytical issue of whether market forces effectively
constrain the content of insurance policy terms. This Part argues
that this misdiagnosis necessitates jettisoning the reasonable
expectations doctrine as a basis for defining the proper scope of the
judicial regulation of insurance policies. Part II.A explains the
practical failure of the reasonable expectations doctrine to evolve
into an analytically coherent basis for the judicial regulation of

160. Keeton, supra note 8, at 967.

161. Id. at 967-68.
162. Id.
163. This is not surprising, given that Keeton's proposed reasonable expectations rule was
reflected in existing case law. Perhaps the best example involved an insurer that positioned
an automated vending machine for flight insurance in front of a charter airline company's
ticket gate. Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 358 (N.Y. 1954). Despite the placement
of the machine, the policy purported to deny coverage for privately chartered flights. Id. at
367. The court nonetheless held that the policy covered an insured who was killed in a charter
flight because the vending machine's placement created a reasonable expectation of coverage.
Id.; see also Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 30-31 (N.J. 1961) (finding
that an "accident insurance policy" created a reasonable expectation of coverage when the
insured was accidentally struck in the head, triggering a preexisting Parkinson's condition,
despite a clause excluding coverage for loss due to disability caused by disease).
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insurance. Part II.B argues that, as a matter of theory, the doctrine
is a poor tool for correcting the market failures that drive the need
for judicial regulation of insurance policies.
A. The Stunted Evolution of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
The reasonable expectations doctrine has figured prominently in
thousands of insurance coverage disputes." 4 But it has failed to
emerge as either a popular or an analytically sound basis for
guiding the judicial regulation of insurance.'6 5 Instead, most of the
cases using reasonable expectations language do not apply the
doctrine as a vehicle for the judicial regulation of insurance policies
at all.
The majority of cases invoking reasonable expectations language
use the doctrine as a proxy for a variety of traditional and uncontroversial contract law principles.'6 6 The most common example is
when courts use the doctrine to fill gaps or ambiguities in policy
language.'6 7 In these cases, courts hold that an insured is entitled
164. According to one recent state survey conducted by a plaintiff, twenty-four states have
adopted some form of reasonable expectations analysis for determining whether a contract
is ambiguous, and thirty-nine allow reasonable expectations analysis to guide the court's
construction of ambiguous language. See Steinberg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D.
67, 77-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). See generally STEMPEL, supranote 16, § 11.1 ("Prior to the express
recognition of the [reasonable expectations] doctrine, courts had been silently following some
variant of this construct for years.").
165. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 180 (concluding that the reasonable expectations
"inquiry has advanced very little beyond Keeton's initial paper"). Some, such as Kenneth
Abraham, argue that courts should eschew the role of regulator, using reasonable
expectations analysis only as a proxy for traditional contract law principles or as an expanded
basis for preventing insurers' affirmative misrepresentations to consumers. Abraham, supra
note 81, at 547-50 (arguing that the strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine serves
the useful, if limited, role of allowing courts to alter their interpretive frameworks where
doing so is efficient but would contravene earlier precedents); Abraham, supra note 13, at
1155 (arguing against the reasonable expectations doctrine when the insurer or agent has
not affirmatively misled the insured); Abraham, supra note 21, at 61-62 (arguing that the
reasonable expectations doctrine can best be used as a guiding principal for state regulators
rather than as a method for allowing judges to overturn unambiguous policy language).
166. See Rahdert, supra note 9, at 345-54.
167. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(2), at 628 n.4 (student
ed. 1988) (noting that "[i]t seems likely that there has always been an implicit understanding
that ambiguities, which in most cases might be resolved in more than just one or the other
of two ways, would be resolved favorably to the insured's claim only if a reasonable person in
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to the coverage he or she would reasonably expect only after finding
that the policy's language is ambiguous. 8' Other courts use the
reasonable expectations principle as an aid to determine whether
there exists a contractual gap at all.169 In this variation, the
reasonable expectations doctrine sets the underlying interpretive
framework for determining the policy's content. 7 ' In yet a third
variety of reasonable expectations cases, courts invoke the doctrine
to provide coverage when "the insurer's words, conduct, or a
situation for which the insurer is responsible have created [an
incorrect] expectation."'' Although these so-called "misleading
impression" cases expand on the doctrine of estoppel, they still fit
comfortably within traditional contract law principles: that a
contracting party misrepresenting pertinent facts may be bound by
those misrepresentations is hardly a radical notion.'72
Only a small minority of states, estimated as falling somewhere
between six and ten, explicitly use a reasonable expectations rule
that resembles judicial regulation of insurance policies."7 3 These
the insured's position would have expected coverage").
168. See id. This gap-filling rule tracks the traditional rule in contract law that, when the
parties have not explicitly resolved an issue in their contract, the court should impose the
terms they would have agreed to had they reached the issue themselves. See Abraham, supra
note 81, at 547.
169. For instance, one recent case concluded that an exclusion in a homeowners policy for
losses caused by settling did not apply when an insured's water pump broke, which led to
water seeping under the insured's house and causing the entire house to twist out of shape.
See West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135, 1136 (Alaska 2000). The court reasoned that the
exclusion was accompanied by other water damage exclusions dealing with "water from
external sources." Id. at 1142. As such, the court found that an ordinary insured would
understand the "settling" exclusion to refer to natural settling that occurs over time, not
sudden settling caused by a burst water pipe. Id. at 1143-44.
170. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 112
(1998-99) (explaining that courts often use the reasonable expectations doctrine to ascertain
the meaning of a policy).
171. Abraham, supra note 13, at 1155. The flight-insurance vending machine scenario is
one example of this type of case. See supra note 163.
172. See 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.13 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2002).
173. Compare Stempel, supra note 18, at 193-94 (describing the number of states who have
adopted Keeton's version of the reasonable expectations doctrine as "relatively small,
numbering approximately a half-dozen"), with Roger C. Henderson, The Formulationof the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and the Influence of Forces Outside Insurance Law, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 69, 72-73 (1998-99) (noting that the reasonable expectations doctrine "has
been embraced by at least ten jurisdictions"). "[D]etermining the exact status of the
reasonable expectations school is difficult" because many state courts are not clear about how
they use the doctrine. STEMPEL, supra note 16, § 11.1, at 313 (footnote omitted).
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cases grant coverage to insureds despite clearly applicable
exclusionary language in the policy and the absence of affirmatively
misleading representations by the insurer.'7 4 Aside from this
unifying theme, though, the cases differ widely in their methodology. 7 In some cases, courts argue that an insurance policy's
language and structure, although perhaps unambiguous from a
technical perspective, are sufficiently confusing to cause an average
person to have an expectation of coverage.' 76 In other cases, courts
conclude that insureds have a reasonable expectation of coverage
based on factors beyond the policy's language and structure, such as
the insurer's advertising practices, underwriting theory, or generalized beliefs among consumers.'7 7
According to a number of insurance law scholars, this variability
in the case law is emblematic of the reasonable expectations
doctrine's inherent vagueness and lack of predictability. 7 8 In most
174. Courts do tend to reserve this more substantive version of the reasonable expectations
doctrine for instances in which the insured is a consumer or small business. STEMPEL, supra
note 16, § 11.4.1, at 325; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated"
Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807, 809 (1993)
(arguing that sophisticated policyholders are also entitled to protection from courts, but
focusing on ambiguity rule).
175. See Rahdert, supra note 170, at 112. Rahdert categorizes these cases into those in
which the court (1) finds the policy terms unconscionable, (2) determines that departing from
policy language is necessary to safeguard the essential objectives of the policy, or (3) enforces
public policy in favor of assured compensation to injured parties. See id. at 112-14.
176. For example, many courts have required insurers to cover liabilities stemming from
insureds' release of toxic fumes despite a provision that excludes coverage for liabilities
caused by the "discharge" or "dispersal" of a "pollutant." A "pollutant" is typically defined as
"any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste." Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Sand Livestock Sys.,
Inc., No. C04-4028-PAZ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12276, at *6 (D. Iowa June 22, 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although most agree that this language unambiguously excludes
liabilities from toxic fumes, many courts hold that a reasonable policyholder would not
understand this point. See id. at **17-24 (reviewing case law).
177. See Rahdert, supra note 9, at 371. For one canonical example, see supra text
accompanying notes 66-69 for a discussion of Atwood v. HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co.,
365 A.2d 744, 746-47 (N.H. 1976). Another illustrative case, Tower Insurance Co. v. Judge,
840 F. Supp. 679,693 (D. Minn. 1993), held that a coverage exclusion for liabilities arising out
of criminal acts did not apply when an insured purposely electrocuted his friend as a prank.
The court reasoned that the exclusion violated the insured's reasonable expectations because
his act "was not inherently criminal but rather was criminal only because of the tragic result."
Id.
178. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 154 (concluding that the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is "little more than judicial expectations masquerading as policyholder
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cases, these commentators observe, "it is unrealistic to suppose that

the insured would actually or reasonably expect the coverage in
' Recent empirical data has confirmed this intuition,
question."179
revealing that when most consumers purchase insurance, they have
few specific expectations about whether they will be insured in
particular factual scenarios. 8 For these reasons, many have argued
"that the reasonable expectations doctrine rests on dubious assumptions" '' and "is difficult to implement in a systematic and principled
fashion."' 82
B. ReasonableExpectations as a Correctivefor Market Failure?
Even assuming that the practical failures of the reasonable
expectations doctrine could be overcome, its theoretical basis as a
method for the judicial regulation of insurance is highly suspect.
Because the doctrine incorrectly targets consumers' lack of assent
to insurance policies, it fails to respond to the market problems that
exist in consumer and small business property/casualty markets. In
fact, it actually exacerbates many of these problems, creating
inefficient coverage and encouraging both the under- and overprovision of information to consumers.
1. Reasonable Expectations and Inefficient Coverage Exclusions
One of the most common justifications for the reasonable
expectations rule is that it protects consumers from unfair and
surprising coverage exclusions.' 8 3 At first glance, this justification
may seem correct; the rule seems to apply when market failure is
expectations"); Frank E. Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution Completed or
Revolution Begun?, 669 INS. L.J. 573, 577-78 (1978); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable
Expectations: Seeking a PrincipledApplication, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 268-72 (1986).
179. Abraham, supranote 13, at 1162; see also Works, supra note 16, at 558 ('The reality,
of course, is that real insureds simply do not have expectations of any kind about most of the
subjects treated by the provisions that lurk unread in their policies .... ").
180. See Thomas, supra note 90, at 333 (concluding "that insureds do not rationally
evaluate insurance information or arrive at specific expectations of coverage").
181. Id.
182. Rahdert, supra note 170, at 133.
183. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 180; Keeton, supra note 8, at 966-67; Rahdert, supra
note 9, at 374-92; Stempel, supra note 18, at 186-87.
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most likely because insureds have incorrect information about the
scope of their coverage. In fact, though, the doctrine does a remarkably poor job of identifying market failure: that some or even many
insureds do not reasonably expect a policy term does not mean that
market mechanisms have not effectively influenced the insurer's
drafting of that term." Precisely because most consumers recognize
how complicated insurance is, they rely on informational sources
that reflect and incorporate the substantive scope of their policies.
Thus, reputation, information intermediaries, and secondary
literature each inform consumers about coverage in a nontechnical
manner that, although imperfect, reflects the underlying policy's
actual scope of coverage." 5 And because market conditions need not
be ideal for insurers to prefer efficient policies, these sources may
deter patently inefficient drafting by insurers. 8 '
Even when the doctrine does correctly identify market failure,
it does not solve it. Consumers may expect coverage that they
would not be willing to pay for if they knew the cost, or, conversely,
may fail to expect coverage for which they would be willing to
pay. Consider one particularly egregious example, Philadelphia
Indemnity InsuranceCo. v. Barerra,in which the insured purchased
supplemental liability insurance beyond the statutory minimum
when he rented a car. 8 7 The policy excluded coverage for accidents
resulting from driving under the influence of alcohol. ' When the
insured, driving intoxicated, was involved in a serious car crash, the

184. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
185. See supra Part I.B.1.
186. See supra note 59. The reasonable expectations rule may also lead courts to ignore
already existing inefficient coverage if courts conclude that broad policy language should
negate consumer expectations of coverage. For example, a series of cases have concluded that
insurers can exclude coverage for liabilities arising from acts of self-defense because the
breadth and clarity of the "intentional acts" exclusion negates whatever expectations of
coverage the insured may have had. See Hewitt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 726 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (La.
Ct. App. 1999); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bauer, 977 P.2d 617, 620 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). That a
clause is broad and clear, though, does not mean that it is efficient. Indeed, in the above cases,
causing injury to someone in the course of acting in self-defense does not present any moral
hazard concerns and may involve low administrative costs in the event of a criminal
determination. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Takeda, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1107 (D. Haw. 2003);
Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 810 (W. Va. 2001).
187. 21 P.3d 395, 397 (Ariz. 2001).
188. Id. at 397-98.

1432

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1389

supplemental insurer denied liability coverage."8 9 The court held
that this denial of coverage violated the insured's reasonable
expectations because the exclusion was buried in fine print. 9 °
Regardless of the court's motivations, its embrace of the reasonable
expectations doctrine effectively mandated that supplemental
automobile coverage in Arizona cover accidents caused by drunk
driving, unless the insurer and insured have a meeting of the minds
to the contrary.' 9 ' This result increases the cost of supplemental
liability coverage for those who do not drink and drive, and potentially increases the overall incidence of drunk driving by allowing
individuals to insure against this risk though it is within their
control.192
2. Reasonable Expectations and Informing Consumers
Despite the reasonable expectations rule's limits at correcting for
inefficient coverage, it might nonetheless be a sensible rule if it led
insurers to convey an efficient amount of information to consumers.
Indeed, many have emphasized that the doctrine encourages
insurers to disclose potentially surprising exclusions to consumers
in order to avoid the prospect of liability.'93
The incentives for disclosure that the rule creates, however, are
far from socially ideal. Insurers will find disclosure to be worthwhile
under the rule only if "the risk of increased liability outweighs ... the
cost of anticipating the insured's expectation of coverage and the

189. Id. at 398.
190. See id. at 400-03. The risk of market failure was slight; regardless of what the insured
knew, this type of exclusion should be unsurprising to anyone knowledgeable about insurance.
191. See id. at 403.
192. In many cases the prospect of losing one's assets may be a more significant deterrent
to drunk driving than the risk of jail time. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Liability
and Insuranceon Heavy Drinking and Drinkingand Driving,38 J.L. & ECON. 49, 73 (1995).
193. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 29, at 45 (describing the rule as an information-forcing
mechanism); Fischer, supra note 16, at 1064 (arguing that the reasonable expectations rule
"is justified as 'best suited to inducing one party to share important information with the
other" (quoting Robert Scott, A RelationalTheory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 608-09 (1990))); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 853 (1990)
(concluding that the reasonable expectation doctrine "eliminates] [the] barriers to intelligent
participation").
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cost of dispelling it. ' '19 4 This incentive structure is badly misaligned
with the socially efficient result. First, the increased liability to the
insurer from not disclosing an unexpected term is unrelated to the
social benefits of such disclosure. An insurer's avoidance of a
payment is not a social benefit, and may well decrease social welfare
if the insured values the money more than the insurer. Instead, the
potential increase in social welfare from disclosure stems from
improving consumer information, which may lead consumers to
make more appropriate coverage decisions. 9 ' Whether the private
benefit to the insurer of disclosing-avoiding future liability-is
larger, smaller, or equal to the social benefit of disclosureimproving consumer information-will vary on a case-by-case basis.
Second, and less intuitively, the private cost of disclosure to the
insurer may be substantially less than the total social costs. An
insurer's efforts to anticipate and disclose unexpected terms are
both private and social costs. But disclosure also creates a social cost
that the insurer need only partially bear: the cost to the consumer
of learning about otherwise unexpected policy terms. This social cost
does not consist merely of the additional effort and time consumers
take to learn more information. Conveying information to consumers also carries the cost of potentially crowding out consideration of
other, more important, issues." The potential for such crowding out
is particularly strong in the case of insurance consumers because of
their limited capacity to conceptualize risk: informing people about
risks can lead them to overestimate the likelihood of those risks'9 7
194. Abraham, supra note 13, at 1172. Disclosure will be particularly unlikely when an
exclusion "involve[s] minor or highly technical components of coverage," but may occur when
the insurer affirmatively creates the insured's misimpression. See id. at 1174.
195. See supraPart I.B.
196. See Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note 28, at 583-84. See generally
Jolls et al., supra note 131, at 1534 (describing how the presentation of information about risk
affects people's ultimate perception of risk). For example, the Food and Drug Administration
recently shifted the disclosure rules for prescription drug labels, requiring simpler and less
comprehensive information to be disclosed. See Gardiner Harris, New Drug Label Rule Is
Intended To Reduce Medical Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at A20. The earlier
requirement of intensely detailed and comprehensive information sheets led to fewer than one
in ten physicians routinely reading drug labels, and caused doctors who did read these labels
to learn little. Id.
197. See Paul Slovic, Informingand Educatingthe PublicAbout Risk, 6 RISKANALYSIS 403
(1986), reprinted in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 182, 184 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000). One study, for
instance, found that people tended to adjust their risk estimates upward when given new
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or ignore other more important risk information. 198 An insurer that
highlights an exclusion may therefore cause consumers to overestimate the likelihood of the associated risk, or to ignore other, more
important, risks. This social cost is borne by both the insurer and
the consumer; as such, the private cost to the insurer of biasing
consumer information will be less than the social cost.
This analysis can be summarized as follows:

Benefit of
disclosure to
insurer >
Social benefit
Benefit of
disclosure to
insurer <
Social benefit
Benefit of
disclosure to
insurer =
Social benefit

Cost of disclosure to
insurer =
Social cost

Cost of disclosure to
insurer <
Social cost

Cell A

Cell D

Overencourages
Disclosure

Overencourages
Disclosure

Cell B

Cell E

Underencourages
Disclosure

Ambiguous
Result

Cell C

Cell F

Correct Amount of
Disclosure

Overencourages
Disclosure

As this matrix suggests, in most instances the reasonable expectations rule will not efficiently encourage the disclosure of potentially
surprising coverage restrictions. If the benefit of disclosure to the
insurer is larger than the social benefit-perhaps because disclosure
will substantially decrease the likelihood of a court invoking the
reasonable expectations doctrine, but will not impact the purchasing
information about why certain risks were unlikely to occur. See M. Granger Morgan et al.,
Powerline Frequency Electric and Magnetic Fields: A Pilot Study of Risk Perception, 5 RISK
ANALYSIS 139 (1985).
198. See W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations
of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 650 (1996). See generally Robert S. Adler & R. David
Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for
Regulation?,1 YALE J. ON REG. 159 (1984) (challenging the efficacy of consumer information
programs).
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decisions of many consumers-then the rule results in
overdisclosure, as suggested in Cells A and D. Overdisclosure also
occurs if the insurer does not bear all of the social costs of disclosure, as Cell F indicates. If, by contrast, the social benefit of
disclosure is larger than the private benefit to the insurer---consider
a very surprising term in the fine print of a policy that does not
result in litigation-then underdisclosure is likely, as depicted in
Cell B.'9 9

III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND THE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF
INSURANCE POLICIES

The failures of the reasonable expectations doctrine call for an
updated doctrinal approach to potentially inefficient, one-sided
terms in the property/casualty insurance industry. To date,
commentators have made a number of attempts to craft such a
framework.2 °° Virtually all of these proposals have been based on
doctrines of contract law.2"' This fact is hardly surprising, given that
Keeton's article originally framed the issue as one of consumers'
lack of assent to insurance policy terms.0 2 But premising the
judicial regulation of insurance on contract law is an odd strategy:
199. The potential that disclosure will create social costs that the insurer need not bear,
in the form of crowding out consumer information, creates some ambiguity about this result,
as suggested in Cell E. But it also suggests that, even when the private benefit to the insurer
of disclosure is equal to the social benefit of disclosure, insurers may disclose too much under
the reasonable expectations rule because they will ignore some segment of the social costs
associated with crowding out consumer risk information.
200. Mark Rahdert, for instance, has argued that courts should defer generally to policy
language, and only overturn provisions in which insurers impose their "naked preferences"
on insureds. Rahdert, supra note 9, at 374-92. Similarly, Jeffrey Stempel has argued that
courts should use "strong" reasonable expectations analysis to counter "absurd hyperliteral
interpretations of policy text." Stempel, supra note 18, at 183-84. Another suggestion,
advanced by Bob Works, is that courts should embrace the disproportionate forfeiture rule of
contract law to prevent insurers from relying on comparatively insignificant coverage
conditions to completely deny coverage to insureds. Works, supranote 16, at 588-89.
201. One exception is the proposal, advanced by at least one court, that the implied
warranty of fitness-a doctrine from the law of sales-may be applicable to insurance law. See
supra note 42.
202. Scholars have frequently defended the reasonable expectations doctrine as an ordinary
principle of contract law, noting that "it is surprising that it has been such a controversial
doctrine" given "how close the doctrine of reasonable expectations hews to the contract law
ideal, of consent." BAKER, supra note 29, at 45; see Stempel, supra note 18, at 273.
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a basic principle of contract law is that courts should not "rewrite
the parties' agreement."2 3
This Part offers an alternative approach to the judicial regulation
of insurance, based on products liability law. As Part III.A explains,
products liability law offers an attractive template for the judicial
regulation of insurance because its core purpose is to respond to
failures in consumer product markets caused by consumer misinformation or bounded rationality. Equally important, the basic
structure of products liability law mirrors the judicial regulation of
insurance: in both cases, the law requires the seller of a product to
compensate the buyer for injury despite the original sale not
including any such right to compensation. Part III.B develops the
specific contours of a products liability approach for the judicial
regulation of insurance. It argues that the doctrine of defective
warnings in products liability law provides a good method for
encouraging efficient disclosure to insurance consumers about the
terms of their policies. It also suggests that the doctrines governing
design defects in products liability law can provide a good method
for inducing insurers to draft efficient policy provisions. As in
products liability law, the potential benefits of these forms of
judicial intervention must be weighed against the costs of such
intervention, which include a potential increase in insurance
litigation and judicial workload. Part III.C discusses the costs and
benefits of a products liability model, and suggests that although
the benefits of limited judicial intervention are likely to outweigh
the costs, further study is needed before the wisdom of intervention
can be confidently embraced.
A. Justifying a ProductsLiability Model
The parallels between products liability law and the judicial
regulation of insurance are striking. Perhaps most significantly, the
core purpose of each judicial doctrine is the same-to correct for the
market failures that result from ordinary consumers' misinforma203. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.19, at 184 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998) ("In
judicial opinions it is often stated that 'the courts do not make a contract for the parties' and
that the parties must be content to perform and to receive performance in accordance with
whatever agreement they themselves chose to form.").
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tion and cognitive limitations. As in insurance markets, °4 fully
informed and rational consumers would obviate the need for products liability law because manufacturers would take an optimal
amount of care in designing and manufacturing their products.2 °5
Most consumers, however, are not fully informed and rational about
product safety. Although they may be informed about the safety
risks associated with generic product types, learning about the
relative safety of different manufacturers' products will frequently
be expensive for consumers. 2 6 Additionally, consumers are subject
to a variety of cognitive biases that, on balance, may lead them to
underappreciate products' safety risks. 0 7 And even when the impact
of these biases on consumer perceptions might otherwise be ambiguous, firms have a natural competitive incentive to manipulate
these biases through advertising and other marketing techniques
that cause consumers to underestimate product risks.0 ' For these
reasons, even legal thinkers who generally prefer not to tamper with
markets acknowledge the potential need for products liability law
to restore manufacturers' proper safety incentives.2 9
204. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
205. These consumers would base their purchasing decisions on a product's true price,
which is the sum of the product's sticker price and the expected accident costs of the product.
See STEVEN SHAVELL, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 51-53 (1987). Consequently,
firms would profit from taking any safety precautions that cost less than the associated
decrease in expected accident costs: the firm could thereby increase the sticker price of the
product by the cost of taking the safety precaution, while reducing the true price of the
product. The quantity demanded would thus increase, resulting in additional sales and
profits.
206. SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 215-17.
207. Compare Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products,and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1240-41 (1994) (arguing that products liability law should correct for
consumers' systematic underappreciation of risk), with Schwartz, supra note 30, at 380
(concluding that "it seems premature to make this experimental data the factual premise of
important legal rules").
208. Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 47, at 1554-58 (arguing that products
liability law should respond to manufacturers' natural incentive to exploit consumers'
cognitive biases).
209. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30, at 280-81 (arguing that products liability
law addresses the fact that consumers inaccurately estimate risk); SHAVELL, supra note 30,
at 214-15 (arguing that when consumers are uninformed about product safety 'Tirms will not
take care in the absence of liability"); VISCUSI, supra note 30, at 64-66 (arguing that the
purpose of products liability law is to remedy "the chief inadequacy of the market," which "is
inadequate risk information"); Goldberg, supra note 30, at 687 (showing that legal
intervention is justified only if consumers are imperfectly informed); Schwartz, supranote 30,
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This perceived inability of the market to produce optimally safe
products parallels the market failures, described in Part I, which
may impact the efficiency of form contracts in many property/
casualty insurance markets. Just as the manufacturer of a tangible
good may face insufficient incentives to design a product to be
optimally safe because consumers will not know about those efforts,
insurers may face insufficient incentives to exert an optimal amount
of effort in precisely delineating risks that can be efficiently covered.
And just as a product manufacturer may affirmatively decide on a
product design that is cheap but unsafe, so too may an insurer
decide on an overly broad coverage restriction that causes insureds
not to receive coverage that can be efficiently provided.
Not only are the purposes of products liability law and the judicial
regulation of insurance identical, but so is the fundamental
structure of each doctrine. First, in both cases the law regulates a
firm's sale of a product to an end consumer: insurance policies are
distinctive among most standard-form contracts because they are
not simply peripheral "product features," but largely constitute the
product that consumers purchase.2 1 ° Second, both products liability
law and the judicial regulation of insurance are structured around
a similar remedial principle: they potentially require that a firm
give its customer compensation when he or she is harmed, despite
the fact that the original sale to the customer did not include any
such right to compensation.2 1 1
The analogy, of course, is imperfect. An insurance policy compensates insureds for harm that is caused by something or someone
else. Products liability law, by contrast, requires only firms whose
defective products cause an injury to pay compensation.1 2 For this
reason, one might reasonably distinguish these two areas of law
based on the fact that the judicial regulation of insurance does not
affect injurers' behavior, whereas the primary purpose of products

at 378 (noting that products liability law should be responsive to information asymmetries
and consumer biases, and that strict liability may be justified if consumers underestimate
risk).
210. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
211. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998); supra notes 17377 and accompanying text.
212. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.
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liability law is to impact potential injurers' actions.2 1 3 But inefficient, one-sided insurance policies harm insureds in much the
same way that a product harms a consumer when it fails to include
a cost-efficient safety device. In both cases, the product fails to
protect the consumer against a risk even though the firm that
designed the product could have efficiently provided such protection.
Consider, for instance, the harm that a safety net causes to a circus
performer who falls from a high-rope and then crashes through the
net's webbing. In one sense, the circus performer's fall is the cause
of his harm. But in another sense, the safety net itself caused the
performer's injury because it did not serve its intended purpose of
protecting the performer from an anticipated risk. An insurance
policy that omits efficient coverage can be understood to harm the
insured in the same way.
B. Constructinga ProductsLiability Model
Products liability law attempts to correct for consumer ignorance
and irrationality through the use of two basic doctrines: defective
warnings and defective designs.2 14 The doctrine of defective product
warnings encourages firms to disclose safety information to
consumers, attempting to correct for market failures directly by
improving consumer information.21 5 In many ways, then, it parallels
the information-forcing rationale of the reasonable expectations
doctrine.2 1 6 The doctrine of defective product designs corrects for
market failures less directly: by forcing firms to internalize the costs
of their inefficient safety designs, it induces them to take an
efficient level of care.2" 7 It thus parallels the ostensible capacity of
213. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
214. Product defects are typically split into three, rather than two, groupings: in addition
to design defects, and defective warnings, products liability law includes a doctrine of
manufacturing defects. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAw 334-35 (2005); JANE
STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABiLITY 250-58 (1994). Manufacturing defects involve products that
have unintended irregularities such as a missing screw or a cracked metal piece. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2. The analogue to a manufacturing
defect in insurance law would be a misprinted insurance policy. Obviously this is not a
significant concern.
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.
216. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
217. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a.
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the reasonable expectations doctrine to deter consumer exploitation.218
1. Defective Warnings
The doctrine of defective warnings in products liability law offers
important insights about how insurance law can potentially induce
efficient disclosure to consumers about the content of insurance
policies. Under the basic Restatement test, firms are strictly liable
for providing an "inadequate" warning or instruction to consumers
"when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions
or warnings., 21' By merely requiring that the warning or instruction
be adequate, the test induces firms to convey a limited amount of
particularly important information to the consumer. This limited
scope of the defective warning doctrine is motivated by the widespread recognition that only a small amount of information can
practically be communicated to most consumers.2 2 ° Communicating
warning information imposes costs on both the recipient and the
transmitter of information. Multiple warnings tend to crowd one
another out, leaving consumers with a diluted set of information
that most will either ignore or fail to appreciate. 2 1 By selectively
218. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c). Early in products liability
law, courts and scholars adopted a unitary definition of a product defect. See OWEN, supra
note 214, at 334. Gradually, though, they began to realize that the issue of how firms should
communicate to consumers is independent from encouraging firms to adopt optimal product
designs. See id. at 334-36. The reasonable expectations doctrine, by contrast, attempts a
unitary solution for the dual concerns of inducing effective communication to consumers and
encouraging efficient product design. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
220. See Latin, supra note 207, at 1195, 1198 ("Product warnings and other disclosure
mechanisms can be effective only when intended recipients are able to receive, comprehend,
and act upon the information imparted," but there are "numerous reasons why consumers do
not read, understand, remember, or follow 'good' warnings."); A.D. Twerski et al., The Use and
Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-DesignDefect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL
L. REV. 495, 511-16 (1976) ("Warnings, in order to be effective, must be selective.... The
warning process, in order to have an impact, will have to select carefully the items which are
to become part of the consumer's mental apparatus while using the product."); Viscusi, supra
note 198, at 627 ("Because people have limited information processing capabilities, it is not
feasible to provide them with unlimited warning information.").
221. See OWEN, supra note 214, at 589-92; Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra
note 28, at 583-84; supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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targeting the information that is particularly likely to decrease
inefficient accidents in ways that other rules cannot, the defective
warning is responsive to both the costs and the benefits of conveying
information to consumers.
Instead of unrealistically encouraging undifferentiated disclosure
to consumers, insurance law could mimic products liability law and
impose insurance coverage for risks that insurers do not "adequately
disclose" to insureds. Either on the declarations page, or in another
appropriately highlighted document, insurers could cheaply and
effectively inform consumers about a limited number of coverage
exclusions and their potential implications. If written in bold, large
print, and placed below a heading with large, capitalized letters
reading '"WARNING," many, if not most, consumers would read an
appropriately limited disclosure. These disclosures would not be
intended as communications to the court, and would not, therefore, govern the adjudication of coverage disputes.2 22 Instead, they
would simply provide a basic explanation of particularly important
types of coverage exclusions and would merely need to be found
"adequate."22' 3 Many insurers and agents already provide such a
warning; recognizing the importance of this warning and subjecting
it to limited judicial scrutiny would be a big step toward improving
insurance consumers' information about their policies.
Of course, this suggestion of limited and targeted disclosure of
policy terms begs the question of precisely which terms should be
highlighted. Although the details of a disclosure regime would need
to be worked out over time, several basic suggestions can be made.
First, insurers could be required to disclose the basic ways in which
their policies substantially deviate from any existing industry
norms.22 4 As discussed in Part I, consumers are particularly unlikely
222. Indeed, insurance policy language is meant to communicate to courts, not consumers.
See Boardman, supra note 56, at 1107; Rappaport, supra note 61, at 240 n.187. In order to
improve consumer information, judicial regulation must address itself to the methods by
which insurers do communicate with insureds, such as declarations pages, brochures, and
Internet websites.
223. They would thus be quite similar in basic design to the disclosures that the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615 (2000), requires credit card companies to make to
consumers. See Bar-Gill, supra note 47, at 1417-20.
224. Requiring State Farm, for instance, to disclose on a 'Varnings" page, in easily
understandable language, that its earth-movement exclusion is broader than the industry
standard, would help to correct the market failure discussed in note 117, supra. If the clause
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to be aware of such deviations in their policies because the companies that are most capable of deviating from standardized language
are also the most likely to sell insurance to them directly, bypassing
informed intermediaries.22 5 Moreover, the cost of this consumer
ignorance may be significant. If large insurers can exploit their size
to incorporate inefficient, one-sided terms into their policies, they
may stymie the sustainability of smaller insurers that help to
promote competition. This proposal is not unprecedented: in the
market for sovereign bond contracts, for instance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has opined that sovereigns must
disclose in their prospectus any deviations from the standard
boilerplate language typically used in such contracts.2 26
Second, and more generally, insurance law could require a basic
disclosure to consumers that they are less likely to receive coverage
if they act in a manner that clearly and obviously increases their
risk of loss. This disclosure requirement parallels the doctrine in
products liability law that firms must provide adequate instructions
to consumers about how to use their products safely.22 7 Instructions
on safe product use enhance efficiency by allowing consumers,
rather than manufacturers, to take an efficient amount of care when
using a product.22 8 Although insureds obviously do not "use" their
insurance as they use other products, insureds who are generally
knowledgeable about their insurance coverage will derive more
value from their insurance as a result. Additionally, informing
insureds about the basic principle of moral hazard, and providing a
is efficient, disclosure will not discourage consumers' purchases. If it is not efficient,
consumers will shop elsewhere unless State Farm either removes the exclusion or offers it as
an option with an associated price decrease.
225. See supra Part I.B.l.b. A similar phenomenon is well known in products liability law.
Consumers often are knowledgeable only about the general risks that a product type carries,
but are not responsive to how safe specific brands of a given product are compared to one
another. See supranote 206 and accompanying text. But because product differentiation along
the dimension of safety is so complicated and difficult to identify, there are no practical ways
to inform consumers directly about this differential. Id. By contrast, the standardization of
policy language in the property/casualty insurance industry allows both courts and insurance
companies to identify the limited ways in which a given policy departs from the ISO standard
form. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
226. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure
Practices,80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1038-40 (2006).
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
228. See OWEN, supra note 214, at 565.
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few simple illustrations, has the side benefit of improving insureds'
own levels of care and activity.22 9
One recurrent issue in California insurance law helps illustrate
the value of a general moral hazard disclosure. Several automobile
insurers in California limit liability insurance for permissive users
of an automobile to the statutory minimum even when the named
insured purchased coverage beyond the statutory minimum.2 30 This
coverage limitation is sensible from a moral hazard perspective,
because a permissive user may be less skilled at driving than the
insured, as well as less familiar than the insured with the particular
vehicle. California courts, however, have repeatedly invalidated
these exclusions because they were not conveyed clearly enough to
the insured.23 ' Although the disclosure that the California courts envision may be unrealistic, the animating concern in their decisions
that insureds are surprised by this coverage limitation is plausible.
A general warning, provided to all consumers, that their policy is
not likely to cover losses stemming from relatively risky behavior
would help counteract this concern. It would prompt many insureds
to think twice before lending their car out to friends or relatives,
and perhaps even to call their insurer or agent to inquire about
their coverage in such situations.
A third potential insurance warning might seek to mitigate
consumers' cognitive biases when it comes to assessing insurance
policy coverage. Rather than assuming the persistence of consumers' bounded ability to assess the limitations of insurance,23 2 this
approach would attempt to help consumers overcome this limitation
through the use of insurance warnings.2 33 A similar strategy has
229. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justificationfor EnterpriseLiability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 181 (1990).
230. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Haynes, 218 Cal. App. 3d 737, 738-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
231. In one case, the exclusion merely appeared on the last page of the policy. See
Thompson v. Mercury Cas. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). In a more
recent case, the exclusion was referenced by number on the declarations page and contained
a heading "PERMISSIVE USER LIMITATION." Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 13 Cal. Rptr.
3d 68, 71 (Cal. 2004).
232. See supra Part I.B.2.
233. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through The Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199, 200 (2006) (describing various ways in which law might "debias" consumers
in a way that "operat[es] directly on the boundedly rational behavior and attempt[s] to reduce
or eliminate it").
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recently been proposed in the consumer safety context: two prominent commentators have suggested that law can address consumers'
tendency to under-appreciate the risks associated with the products
they use by triggering countervailing biases, such as the availability
heuristic or framing effects.23 4 Insurance warnings might similarly
attempt to counteract consumers' tendency to under-appreciate
insurance exclusions for low-probability risks by employing
availability or framing effects. An insurance warning could, for
instance, remind people of the percentage of Hurricane Katrina
related claims that were turned down by insurers and subsequently
litigated.23 5 A different approach might use insurance warnings to
lengthen consumers' time horizons so certain underappreciated
risks seem more sizeable: evidence suggests that people respond
more rationally to risks that are estimated over a significant
period of time. 236 A warning indicating the likelihood of being
denied coverage for a large claim over the course of a lifetime
could potentially counteract consumers' inattention to the limits of
insurance when it comes to significant losses.
Yet a fourth warning strategy could inform consumers about
specific limitations in their insurance coverage that could be
addressed by purchasing state-underwritten supplemental coverage.
State-underwritten insurance schemes often rely on private insurers
to inform consumers about the availability of this supplemental
coverage. For instance, private insurance companies sell federallyunderwritten flood insurance. 7 Similarly, the California Earthquake Authority relies on participating insurers to sell its policies.2 3
However, private insurers are likely to have inadequate incentives
to market these policies to their customers: "[a]lthough private
insurance companies receive expense allowances and reimbursements from the government for selling [these types of] insurance,
234. See id. at 209-12.
235. The effectiveness of this strategy would obviously need to be tested. Some evidence
suggests, for instance, that even informing people about risks with lurid details will do little
to convince them to insure against risks that are perceived to be too unlikely to worry about.
See Slovic et al., supra note 133, at 76.
236. Id. at 77.
237. See The National Flood Insurance Program, http://www.fema.gov/planlprevent/
floodplainaboutthe-nfip.shtm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
238. See California Earthquake Authority, General Information, http://www.earthquake
authority.com/CEAGeneralInformation.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
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they do not earn any investment income from insureds' premium
dollars, a primary source of income for ordinary insurance
policies."23' 9 It is therefore hardly surprising that one study found
that homeowner "insureds are more likely than not to incorrectly
assume damages due to floods were covered, and nearly as likely to
incorrectly assume that damages due to earthquakes were covered"
by their homeowner policies. 2 4° Requiring insurers to warn their
customers about these limitations in ordinary insurance policies
could enhance consumer information about the limits of ordinary
insurance and encourage consumers to consider purchasing this
supplemental coverage.
Ultimately, one of the virtues of an adequate disclosure requirement is that it could gradually develop, in light of issues faced in
real cases, to reflect a sensible set of disclosure rules. The suggestions offered here may need to be supplemented or decreased in
breadth. Either way, the general approach of current insurance law
doctrines has much to learn about informing consumers from the
limited and targeted approach of products liability law.
2. Insurance Harms and Design Defects
The doctrines of products liability law also suggest a method for
implementing the judicial regulation of insurance in a way that can
help improve insurers' incentives to draft efficient policies. Following products liability law, courts could improve the drafting
incentives of insurers by imposing insurance coverage, despite clear
policy language to the contrary, when the coverage dispute involves
(a) a provision that is particularly likely to be the result of inefficient drafting by insurers due to market failure ("insurance harms"),
and (b) policy language that fails a cost-benefit, reasonablealternative-design test that assesses whether the insurer acted
inefficiently in choosing to draft or adopt policy language ("insurance design defects").24 1 When there is both an insurance harm and
an insurance design defect, (c) insurers could be required to pay
239. See Daniel Schwarcz, Keep On Giving to Katrina Relief, DENVER POST, Sept. 17, 2005,
at E-05 (on file with author).
240. See Thomas, supranote 90, at 322.
241. See infra notes 243-88 and accompanying text.
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coverage that causes them to internalize the costs of their failure to
act efficiently ("damages").2 42
a. Deviationsfor a Clause's Purposeas an InsuranceHarm
Many coverage exclusions present only slight risks of market
failure or can be easily checked via conventional ex ante state
insurance regulation.2 4' Testing such provisions for efficiency can
result in large costs that are offset by insignificant benefits.24 4 First,
any uniform application of an imprecise test over a large number of
samples creates the significant risk of false positives-in this

scenario, cases in which courts err and refuse to enforce efficient
coverage exclusions. Such false positives are particularly problematic in the insurance context because risks that cannot be predicted
ex ante, or eliminated by pooling, create especially large costs for
insurers.245 Second, even if the legal test was particularly accurate,
indiscriminately applying it to clauses that present only a slight risk
of market failure would result in significant administrative costs.
Courts would need to confirm that each clause was efficient even
when that result seemed relatively certain without in-depth
examination.
These concerns are minimized in products liability law because
that set of doctrines applies only when the consumer-plaintiff has
been harmed by the firm's product. From a traditional perspective,
of course, this requirement of harm follows from the purpose of

242. See infra notes 289-301 and accompanying text. In the case of an affirmative
misrepresentation, the insurer should be liable under principles articulated by Abraham. See
Abraham, supra note 13, at 1155; see also supra note 171 and accompanying text. Although
the misleading impression cases fit within traditional contract law concepts, see supra note
172 and accompanying text, they are also analogous to misrepresentation in product law.
Because misrepresentation about product features is not within the realm of products liability
law, see OWEN, supra note 214, at 335, Abraham's proposal is not incorporated into the
products liability model developed herein.
243. See supra Part I.C.2.
244. This result points to yet another limitation of the reasonable expectations doctrine:
it attempts to correct unfair, oppressive, or inefficient terms ex post by applying a single test
to all challenged coverage exclusions. See supra Part II.B.1.
245. See Abraham, supra note 15, at 222-23. As Abraham explains, uncertainty about the
scope of coverage at the time of sale creates an "uncertainty tax" on the purchase of insurance.
Id.
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products liability law: to compensate those who are injured.2 46 But
from an economic perspective such compensation is not necessary:
first-party insurance, many economists argue, would be a more
2 47
efficient vehicle than tort law for compensating accident victims.
Instead, the economic view is that products liability law compensates accident victims due both to the particularly large risk that
manufacturers will take insufficient safety precautions, and to the
large social welfare consequences of this type of market failure.2 48
Any rule for the judicial regulation of insurance should embrace
a similar dichotomy between product features that are likely to
involve market failure and those that are not. Plaintiffs should not
be able to argue for "judge-made insurance" in any coverage dispute,
regardless of the risk of market failure or the consequences of such
market failure. Instead, as in products liability law, the judicial
regulation of policy terms should be available to plaintiffs only when
there is a particularly strong reason to believe that market failure
has allowed insurers to act inefficiently in drafting their policy, and
when the harms of such market failure are particularly large. There
is consequently a need to define an insurance harm-a category of
uninsured losses in which the applicable coverage exclusion is
particularly likely to be the result of inefficient behavior by the
insurer due to market failure.24 9
This Article proposes defining an "insurance harm" as the denial
of insurance coverage when any ambiguity exists, from an ex post
246. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5-6 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984).

247. See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 267-68; George L. Priest, The CurrentInsuranceCrisis
and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1524-26 (1987).
248. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. Products liability law could
theoretically compensate consumers who purchased products that merely disappointed them,
such as a radio or television that failed to work well. From a law and economic perspective,
judicial intervention is not warranted in these instances only because the market is presumed
to work well, and the costs when it does not work well are not substantial. See OWEN, supra
note 214, at 332-33.
249. In products liability law, inefficient manufacturer actions are particularly likely when
a consumer has been injured. But the same test cannot be employed in insurance law, because
a core feature of insurance is that it protects against only a limited number of risks. Allowing
insureds to argue for "judge-made insurance" whenever they have been denied coverage would
thus be analogous to allowing consumers to argue for compensation when they have received
a cell phone that does not have a loud enough ring tone, or a television whose picture is not
sufficiently crisp.
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perspective, about whether the underwritingpurposesof the applicable policy exclusion warrantnot covering the loss at issue. Under this
test, a court would ask whether the insurer has any legitimate
underwritingpurpose for not insuring against the specific loss that
befell the insured. Most textbook accounts of insurance list the
following five basic underwriting purposes in order for a loss to be
insurable: the loss must be (1) measurable and (2) observable, and
must involve (3) low correlation, (4) low risk of moral hazard, and
(5) low risk of adverse selection.2 50 A sixth underwriting purpose-that the risk be anticipated--obviously does not apply when
analyzing whether a risk is ex post insurable."' Finally, a crucial
underwriting purpose often ignored in traditional insurance
'
textbooks is the reduction of "juridical hazard."2 52
This term
encompasses the transaction costs to insurers of deciding whether
to pay a claim, which include the costs of fact gathering and legal
fees.2 53 Often, insurance policies are written using bright-line rules
that imperfectly facilitate legitimate underwriting purposes while
minimizing juridical hazard, because they are easy to apply after an
insured has incurred a loss. 21 4 Application of these clauses should
not be considered an insurance harm, because they serve a legitimate and important underwriting function that often enhances the
overall efficiency of the insurance arrangement.
To see how this definition of an insurance harm would operate,
consider a few examples. One good example of an insurance harm
comes from Coblentz v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co., in which the insured purchased a homeowners policy with an
endorsement that required the insurer to pay for the replacement

250. Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and
Incomplete Insurance Contracts 4 tbl.1 (The Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., CFS Working Paper,
No. 2005/24,2005), availableat http://irm.wharton.upenn.edu/muermann/dohertymuermann
10 1905.pdf; see also BARUCH BERLINER, LIMITS OF INSURABILITY OF RISKS 3-4 (1982) (analyzing

the criteria of insurability).
251. Doherty & Muermann, supranote 250, at 4 tbl.1.
252. See EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 68 (1935); Works, supra
note 16, at 610-11 ('CThough introductory insurance texts ... do not give 'juridical hazard' the
same prominence as [other underwriting concerns], the real-world importance of 'juridical
hazard' clearly is reflected in a variety of insurance practices and institutions .....
253. See PATTERSON, supra note 252, § 68.
254. See Works, supra note 16, at 610-11.
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cost of any lost or damaged goods.25 The endorsement required the
insured to complete repairs before he received any insurance money
beyond the market value of the property at the time of the loss. 56 Its
purpose was to prevent insurance fraud: because replacement value
is generally greater than market value,257 insureds looking to move
could potentially profit by destroying their home and collecting
insurance rather than selling the house. When Coblentz's house was
destroyed by a tornado, the insurer paid about $16,000, the market
value of the home, but withheld the additional $20,000 needed to
replace the home until construction was complete.25 8 Unfortunately,
without this $20,000 Coblentz did not have enough capital to pay for
replacing the home.25 9 This exclusion of coverage would be an
insurance harm. From an ex post perspective, it is relatively clear
that the applicable clause's underwriting purpose did not apply:
Coblentz's home was destroyed by a tornado,"c° which is impossible
to fake. Importantly, the reason the excessively broad clause did not
take into account situations such as Coblentz's had nothing to do
loss
with reducing juridical hazard: the very nature of Coblentz's
21
made clear that the underwriting purpose did not apply.
255. 915 P.2d 938, 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995), overruled by Bratcher v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 828, 831 (Okla. 1998).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., id. (finding that the cash (market) value of plaintiffs' home was approximately $20,000 less than the claimed replacement value).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. For another example of an insurance harm, consider a popular exclusion in aircraft
insurance policies for loss caused by wear and tear to the airplane. This exclusion provides
that any "damage caused by heat which results from the operation, attempted operation or
shutdown of the engine" constitutes "wear and tear." Meridian Leasing, Inc. v. Associated
Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 409 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Arawak Aviation, Inc. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 285 F.3d 954, 955 (11th
Cir. 2002) (containing nearly identical exclusion language). The purpose of the "wear-andtear" exclusion is to exclude nonfortuitous losses that predictably result from continued use
of an airplane. Nonetheless, airplane insurers have occasionally invoked the clause to deny
coverage in situations that seemingly depart from this purpose. In Meridian,for instance, an
insurer relied on the wear-and-tear exclusion to deny coverage when an airplane, purchased
several months earlier, exploded and burned as the pilot attempted to start the engine. 409
F.3d at 344-45. In Arawak, the insurer relied on the clause to deny coverage when the pilot
did not properly secure the oil cap on the engine, leading to excessive heat during flight. 285
F.3d at 955. Both cases present examples of insurance harms because the insurer was relying
on a coverage exclusion when the underwriting purpose of that exclusion did not clearly
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For a second, more prominent example of an insurance harm,
consider the "absolute pollution exclusion," which broadly prohibits
coverage for all liabilities "arising out of the .... discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release, or escape of .... any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste."26' 2 The underwriting purposes of this clause are to limit the risks of adverse selection
and moral hazard inherent to gradual pollution that suddenly
became significant after the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).263
But the clause's sheer breadth means that insurers often invoke it
to deny coverage, even when the nature of the loss makes clear that
doing so does not advance these underwriting purposes.26 4 In one
case, for example, an insured's employees accidentally spilled
ammonia from a blueprint machine in the course of moving
equipment.2 6 In another case, a construction worker applied a
sealant to a warehouse floor that immediately contaminated the
food stored in the building.2 66 In each of these instances, an insurer's
reliance on the absolute pollution exclusion to deny coverage would
be considered an insurance harm because, from an ex post perspective, it is self-evident from the nature of the loss that the clause's
purpose would not warrant the denial of coverage; both cases
involve sudden accidents that do not implicate the adverse selection
or moral hazard problems of gradual pollution. Nor can the absolute
pollution clause be justified in these cases on grounds that it
encompass avoiding the losses at issue.
262. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the 'Absolute"
Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS.
L.J. 1, 2 (1998) (quoting Ins. Servs. Office, Inc. CGL Form CG 00 02 11 88 (1988)); see Kenneth
S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942,
952-54 (1988) (discussing the pollution exclusion).
263. Abraham, supra note 262, at 952-54.
264. See Stempel, supra note 262, at 3-5 (noting that "[i]nsurer attorneys have ... argued
vigorously that the exclusion is clear and was intended to bar coverage for any claim in which
a 'pollutant' contributed to the injury"); see also Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Without some limiting principle, the
pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some
absurd results.").
265. Deni Assocs. of Fla. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (Fla.
1998).
266. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Becker Warehouse, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 112, 114-15 (Neb. 2001).
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reduced juridical hazard: the very character of the losses described
above indicated that the core underwriting purposes of reduced
moral hazard and adverse selection did not apply.
Contrast these examples of insurance harms with two different
cases. First, consider a straight forward example: the Katrinarelated litigation discussed at the outset of this Article. Recall that
in this litigation, victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma
have sought to compel their private insurers to cover flood damage
to their homes even though flood damage is specifically excluded
from all homeowners insurance policies.2 67 The exclusion of these
losses would not be an insurance harm. The reason why private
insurers do not cover flood damage-to avoid highly correlated
risks 26s
2is
precisely applicable to the recent hurricanes: when
floods occur, many insureds with the same risk profiles suffer
extensive damage.
Now consider a second, more difficult example from the classic
insurance case Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual
Insurance Co.269 Atwater featured a common clause in commercial
burglary policies that excluded coverage for burglaries when there
were no visible marks of forced entry on any external doors or
windows.2 7 ° The clause encouraged employers to hire trustworthy
employees, because it tended not to cover "inside jobs," where
external marks of entry would be less likely to exist.2 7 ' It also
encouraged insureds to properly lock all windows and doors. Based
on these underwriting purposes, the Atwater court concluded that
the clause should not apply in the case before it because the
evidence strongly suggested that the specific insured's loss was
27 2
attributable neither to an inside job nor to insufficient care.
Although intuitively attractive, this reasoning would not support
the finding of an insurance harm. The visible marks clause served
267. See Schwarcz, supra note 239.
268. Insurers pool risks by grouping together a large number of policyholders who face
similar but independent risks, so that they are able to take advantage of the law of large
numbers. When risks cannot be made predictable in this way, insurers must hold large
amounts of liquid capital so that they are able to remain solvent in the event of large losses.
For an explanation of why this strategy is so costly, see supra note 85.
269. 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (en banc).
270. Id. at 275.
271. Id. at 276 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. See id. at 278-79.
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a legitimate underwriting purpose in Atwater because it reduced
juridical hazard. Unlike both Coblentz and the Pollution Exclusion
cases, the nature of the loss in Atwater did not make clear that the
underwritingpurpose did not apply. This was only clear to the court
after it examined all of the evidence at hand, and concluded that the
burglary was not an inside job and that Atwater had taken an
adequate amount of care. But such ex post factual investigation is
costly, and, for that reason, providing coverage that would require
it may well be inefficient.
Defining an insurance harm in this way has a number of
advantages consistent with the requirement in products liability law
that plaintiffs be the victims of harm caused by a firm's product.
First, and most important, most coverage exclusions will clearly not
constitute insurance harms, because losses will typically either fall
squarely within the underwriting purpose of a coverage exclusion or
be clearly covered by the policy. Consequently, the rule would avoid
the problems of false positives, lack of predictability, and high
administrative costs that plague application of the reasonable
expectations doctrine."' Second, potential deviations from a clause's
underwriting purposes should be relatively easy for courts to
identify ex post in the context of specific cases. Indeed, some courts
at present opine on deviations from underwriting purposes in the
course of interpreting ambiguous coverage provisions.2 74
273. To be sure, there still might be an uncertainty tax, to use Abraham's phraseology. See
supra note 245.
274. See, e.g., Herald Square Loft Corp.v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 344 F. Supp. 2d
915,921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that a pollution exclusion was ambiguous about whether
liabilities arising from lead paint were excluded because the general purpose of the pollution
exclusion is "to shield insurers from the costs of environmental cleanups" (quoting Belt
Painting Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 100 N.Y.2d 377, 386 (2003))). For this reason, one potential
objection to the proposed definition of an insurance harm is that it does not move significantly
beyond the ambiguity rule. This potential overlap between the ambiguity rule and the
proposed insurance harm concept, though, is a potential pitfall of any conceivable regime for
the judicial regulation of insurance. The ambiguity rule "provides no guidance as to the
criteria to be used in determining when a policy provision is or is not reasonably subject to
two interpretations." Abraham, supranote 81, at 538; supra text accompanying notes 166-70
(discussing how some courts use the reasonable expectations test when in truth they are
interpreting ambiguities). It is therefore inevitable that some courts will imbue the ambiguity
rule with meaning that potentially overlaps with a proposal for the judicial regulation of
insurance. In any event, most courts do indeed refuse to look at the underwriting purpose of
clauses they view to be linguistically unambiguous. See, e.g., Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gulf
Underwriters Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 821, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1998); Technical Coating Applicators,
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Third, the proposed insurance harm definition does a reasonably
good job of segregating out coverage exclusions that are most likely
to be inefficiently designed in a way that the judiciary can plausibly
address. It does so by attempting to isolate clauses that fail to
anticipate specific loss scenarios, and are thus too broad relative to
their underwriting justification. Although the denial of coverage
may be inefficient even when there is a legitimate underwriting
purpose for not covering the loss, there is at least some reason to
believe that such exclusions are sensible, and resolving the issue is
likely to be difficult. Moreover, fewer reasons exist to be skeptical
about how well the insurance market works when it comes to such
cases, which will tend to involve losses that the applicable exclusion
clearly contemplated. Insurance markets should work better in
checking the efficiency of these clauses, because insurance information intermediaries will tend to be knowledgeable about the
paradigmatic applications of different exclusions.27 5 Additionally,
traditional ex ante review of policy terms by state regulators should
provide a sufficient check against obviously intended overreaching
by insurers. Although regulators may frequently fail to grasp the
breadth of policy language, they generally anticipate the types of
losses the clause is intended to exclude and evaluate the appropriateness of those provisions.
b. Defective Insurance Designs
Simply because a product harms a consumer does not mean that
a firm has acted inefficiently and sold a defective product. As such,
the products liability rule in virtually every jurisdiction is that a
Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 157 F.3d 843, 846 (11th Cir. 1998); Owners Ins. Co. v. Farmer,
173 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1333-34 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Becker Warehouse, Inc.,
635 N.W.2d 112, 118-21 (Neb. 2001); Natl Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d
517, 521-22 (Tex. 1995).
275. See supra Part I.B.l.b. Consumers would also be more likely to find out about the
straightforward application of policy terms via secondary literature. See supra Part I.B. 1.c.
276. See supra Part I.C.2. Indeed, this is precisely why regulatory approval relating to a
product's safety is relevant in a product liability suit only "with respect to the risks sought to
be reduced by the statute or regulation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 4(b) (1998). See generally Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products
Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000) (considering "the appropriate weight to be assigned to
regulatory compliance").
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product must have been defectively designed for a plaintiff to be
entitled to recovery.27 7 This requires that "the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. 278
Known as the "risk-utility test," this definition of a design defect has
been widely embraced by scholars, and by a significant number of
courts." 9 Defining design defects in this way helps correct market
failures that lead to inefficiently unsafe products by identifying
when the market has failed to induce the manufacturer to take an
optimal level of care in designing a product.
Interestingly, the old and widely criticized28 ° test in products
liability law for defining a design defect was almost precisely the
same as the reasonable expectations test in insurance law. The
"consumer expectations" approach to defining design defects asked
whether the product was "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.""' The reasons that products liability scholars
typically reject this consumer expectations test largely parallel the
reasons that the reasonable expectations doctrine is not a good
method for identifying inefficient coverage exclusions. First, like the
reasonable expectations test, both courts and scholars have found
the test to be unavoidably vague. 2 Second, it is both under- and
over-inclusive in identifying inefficient product designs." 3
Insurance law could follow products liability law and jettison its
consumer expectations approach in favor of a defective design test
277. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.

278. Id. § 2(b).
279. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
ProductDesign, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 882-89 (1998). See generally Douglas A. Kysar, The
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003) (reviewing the scholarly embrace
of the risk utility test over the consumer expectations test, but noting less enthusiasm from
courts for this shift).
280. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 279, at 876-83.
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. 1 (1965); see Kysar, supra note 279, at
1701-02.
282. Compare STAPLETON, supra note 214, at 236, and Kysar, supra note 279, at 1715-16,
with Part II.A.
283. Compare Kysar, supra note 279, at 1716-18, with Part II.B.1.
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that evaluates whether an insurance harm was the result of
inefficient insurer behavior, by applying a marginal cost-benefit test
premised on reasonable alternative designs. As in products liability
law, the mere existence of an insurance harm does not necessarily
mean that an insurer has acted inefficiently in drafting a policy, and
should not, therefore, be sufficient for an insured to prevail in a
coverage suit. Such a system would not only penalize insurers even
when they may well have acted efficiently, but would encourage
excessive litigation." 4 If, however, a plaintiff can show that (1) the
insurance harm was foreseeable ex ante, and (2) could have been
avoided by reasonable alternative language, the inefficiency of the
insurer's drafting will be clear."'
To see how this proposal would work, reconsider two of the
examples discussed in the insurance harms section. In Coblentz, the
plaintiff suffered an insurance harm when his insurer would not pay
him the replacement cost of his house until after construction was
complete, yet he could not complete construction without his
insurance proceeds.2 86 Before the plaintiff could establish liability,
he would need to show that the risk of this result was foreseeable ex
ante and could be resolved by reasonable alternative language. This
would likely not be difficult in Coblentz because the overbreadth of
the policy's replacement clause relative to its underwriting purpose
was fairly obvious, and it could have been reasonably resolved ex
ante through myriad drafting techniques.2 7

284. Insurance law could conceivably embrace the enterprise liability standard that has
been rejected in products liability law. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 229, at 168-73. Under
the enterprise liability standard, a plaintiff would be entitled to coverage so long as he were
able to show an insurance harm. This approach could conceivably reduce the costs of litigating
what the insurer should have foreseen from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, to the extent
that these losses cannot be efficiently avoided, the insurer is clearly the more efficient risk
bearer than the insured. As noted above, though, such a system would be likely to produce
excessive litigation. Moreover, in products liability law, the core benefit of an enterprise
liability regime is that it optimizes consumers' activity levels even if consumers are insured.
See id. There is no analogous benefit to enterprise liability in the insurance context.
285. For a discussion of the capacity of courts to employ this test in practice, see infra text
accompanying notes 311-12.
286. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
287. For instance, the clause could have provided that insurance money in excess of the
market value of the home will be paid directly to contractors or builders who are replacing the
home.
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Now consider the absolute pollution exclusion,"'8 which presents
a less straightforward case: although clearly overbroad, resulting in
the potential for insurance harms, the clause may well be the result
of efficient behavior by insurers. There may simply be no feasible
linguistic way to better carve out the types of losses against which
the pollution exclusion is meant to protect than the absolute
pollution exclusion. If so, then insureds should not be allowed to
receive coverage by bringing suit: the prospect of resolving all
coverage disputes involving insurance harms ex post through
litigation is likely to be the least efficient solution of all.
c. Damages
Once plaintiffs show both an insurance harm and a defective
policy design, they would be entitled to "damages." Products liability
law discourages defective product designs by requiring firms to pay
for the social costs caused by those product defects. Assuming that
a firm's design is indeed inefficient, this penalty should encourage
manufacturers to take an efficient amount of care.28 9 To correct for
the legal system's inability to compensate for some harm that
defective products cause, tort law also occasionally imposes punitive
damages.29 If punitive damages roughly correspond to the likelihood that a firm's behavior will not be challenged in court, firms will
internalize the costs of their defective products even when those
product defects are unlikely to be prosecuted.2 9'
Requiring insurers to provide coverage in the event of an
insurance harm caused by a defective policy design limits insurers'
affirmative incentive to draft overbroad, careless, or exploitive
exclusions. Unlike products liability law, however, it does not
necessarily provide insurers with an incentive to use an optimal
amount of care in drafting their policies: instead of incurring the ex
ante cost of drafting a more efficient insurance policy, an insurer
could simply use inefficient policy language and pay the costs of
288. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
289. See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 219-20.
290. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, PunitiveDamages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARv. L. REv. 869, 872 (1998) (discussing "the merits of punitive damages").
291. See id. at 873-74.
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coverage if, and when, the insured challenges the clause.29 2 The
insurer would find this course attractive because the most the
insured could win as a result of that challenge would simply be what
he or she would be entitled to had the clause been redrafted in the
first place.
Consider one prominent example of this phenomenon. Many
liability insurance policies explicitly provide that the insurer has
complete control over litigation expenditures and the decision
whether to settle. Although generally a sensible method for reducing
moral hazard in litigation spending, the clause can result in an
insurance harm in some cases. When potential liability in a suit
exceeds the total amount of liability coverage under the policy, the
purpose of the clause-to eliminate moral hazard by allowing the
financially interested party to make litigation decisions-is no
longer applicable.2 93 Instead, the insurer and insured may have
conflicting incentives about when to settle and how much to spend
in litigation costs.29 4 Since the landmark case Crisci v. Security
InsuranceCo. ,295 courts have recognized this problem and developed
solutions to it. Today, a wide body of case law carefully defines when
an insurer has a duty to settle, and applies regardless of an
insurance policy's statement to the contrary. 296 This case law would
likely allow a plaintiff to overcome the second hurdle of the design
defect proposal: it essentially defines the reasonable alternative
292. See Korobkin, supranote 45, at 1286-90.
293. See Robert E. Keeton, LiabilityInsuranceand Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1136, 1136-37 (1954); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1116
(1990). But see Alan 0. Sykes, JudicialLimitations on the Discretionof Liability Insurers to
Settle or Litigate.An Economic Critique, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1345, 1348, 1361-65 (1994) (arguing
that policies granting unfettered discretion to insurers are not likely to be the result of market
failure, but instead may reflect an attempt to limit the judgment-proof problem). See Kyle D.
Logue, Solving the Judgment-ProofProblem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1380-83 (1994) (reviewing
Sykes's argument, and finding that, at least with regard to policies geared toward
unsophisticated consumers, clauses that grant insurers unfettered right to make settlement
decisions are likely the result of market failure).
294. Syverud, supra note 293, at 1116.
295. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
296. See, e.g., Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 183 F.3d 578, 582-83 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding an insurer liable when it failed to settle within the primary policy limits
when it had a chance to do so); Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 26-27
(N.Y. 1993) (noting that "It]he duty of'good faith' settlement is an implied obligation derived
from the insurance contract").
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design that an insurance policy could use to eliminate the insurance
harm.2 9 7 Even if the case law could not be easily condensed into
policy language, the policy could simply acknowledge the principles
developed in the case law. Nonetheless, insurers continue to draft
most liability insurance policies to stubbornly proclaim that the
insurer always controls the costs of litigation and the decision
whether to settle.2 9 The reason that insurance policies ignore this
judicially crafted exception is because insurers have nothing to lose
from doing so:2 99 if an insured invokes the case law, the insurer is in
the same position it would be in had it included the exception in the
policy itself. But, if an insured does not invoke the case law or
cannot credibly commit to litigating the issue, the insurer can avoid
the judicially mandated rule.
Allowing insurers to retain inefficient language that can be
judicially corrected ex post can lead to two types of social costs.
First, this approach only provides optimal insurance to consumers
who litigate or are savvy enough to know that they could litigate the
issue. Even then, these insureds may only receive this insurance
after a significant period of time has elapsed in litigation. Second,
this approach results in significant judicial costs that could be
avoided by the insurer providing the coverage through redrafted
language. °°
To eliminate insurers' incentive to use this strategy and instead
encourage them to draft efficient policy terms ex ante, they could be
required to pay a premium above the coverage amount that the
297. Allowing insurers to completely control settlement also has negotiation advantages,
as they are sophisticated parties that are generally risk-neutral with respect to litigation
losses and can credibly limit settlement offers due to their internal corporate structure. See
Syverud, supranote 293, at 1137-38. The case law that defines an insurer's duty to settle does
a good job of providing a reasonable alternative design because it is responsive to this benefit
while limiting the insurance harm that results from potential liabilities that exceed policy
limits.
298. Id. at 1118. The typical language of this provision is that the insurer "may make such
investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as [the insurer] deems expedient." Id.
(quoting INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMPREHENSIVE PERSONAL LIABILITY ENDORSEMENT 2
(1973)). Certain insurance policies-in particular, professional liability policies-do explicitly
give settlement authority to the insured. See id. at 1173-76. In these cases, even a settlement
below the policy limit may not be desirable for the insured, because the nonmonetary
reputation costs of a settlement can be quite high.
299. Id. at 1164.
300. Id. at 1165.
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insured would ordinarily be due if a plaintiff can successfully
establish an insurance harm caused by a defective policy. The
premium would need to offset several costs that insurers could
otherwise externalize. First, like punitive damages in tort law, it
must eliminate the cost savings to the insurer that, in the event of
an inefficient policy, would result from insureds who do not litigate.
Second, it should make the insurer internalize the administrative
costs of litigating defective policy provisions. Interestingly, at least
some jurisdictions seem to endorse a variant of this approach when
it comes to the duty to settle: in some states, plaintiffs can recover
attorneys' fees or emotional distress damages when the insurer is
found to have violated its judicially constructed duty to settle. °1
3. The Interactionof Design Defects and Defective Warnings
Following the lead of products liability law, the two types of
insurance claims described above should be mutually exclusive from
one another, so that insureds can assert defective design claims
against insurers regardless of the adequacy of the warnings that the
insurer provides, and vice versa. Products liability adheres to this
rule because of the inherent limitations of warnings. Although the
effectiveness of warnings varies, "[p]sychological and consumer
behavior studies indicate that inattention to warnings is an
inevitable result of limited cognitive capacity, memory, attention
span, and time."30 2 Most jurisdictions and commentators now agree
that, for this reason, a defectively
designed product cannot be made
30 3
safe with a good warning.
As in products liability law, even the most laudable attempts at
communicating information to a consumer will often not result in
the consumer fully incorporating that information into his decision301. See id. at 1120-21 & nn.16-18 (reviewing case law of states with each doctrine).
302. Latin, supra note 207, at 1198. "Product warnings and other disclosure mechanisms
can be effective only when intended recipients are able to receive, comprehend, and act upon
the information imparted," but there are "numerous reasons why consumers do not read,
understand, remember, or follow 'good' warnings." Id. at 1195, 1198.
303. Owing to a comment in the Restatement Second of Torts, some courts and scholars in
early years of tort law originally suggested that a sufficiently good warning could serve as a
defense. See OWEN, supra note 214, at 335-47. The prevailing view now rejects this position.
See id. at 348-50.
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making process. Because of the significant evidence that insureds
tend to be subject to an array of cognitive biases,1 4 a rule allowing
insurers to design any coverage scheme they want if they inform
consumers might allow insurers to exploit consumers' cognitive
limitations. Allowing insureds to argue that a clause highlighted in
a warning resulted in an insurance harm and was defective would
help to address this concern. This result stands in stark contrast to
the dominant interpretation of the reasonable expectations doctrine,
which allows an insurer to exclude coverage for any loss so long as
the exclusion is adequately communicated to the insured.0 5
C. The Costs of a ProductsLiability Model
This Article stops short of arguing that courts should unequivocally adopt the proposed products liability model for the judicial
regulation of insurance. Just as with products liability law, the
proposals sketched out above would undoubtedly have significant
costs. A potentially significant segment of insureds, armed with new
doctrinal vehicles to attack unfavorable insurance outcomes, might
choose to sue when they otherwise would not. Faced with increased
litigation costs, insurers would raise the price of policies and courts
would adjudicate additional disputes.0 6
The size of these costs largely depends on the extent to which the
proposal would increase insurance-related litigation, which is hard
to predict. The increase in insurance litigation stemming from the
defective warning proposal would likely be marginal, as the
requirement of an adequate warning is a relatively low bar for
insurers to meet and the content of such warnings could be easily
developed in initial litigation given the uniformity of most insurance
304. See supra Part I.B.2.
305. See ABRAHAM, supra note 53, at 48-49.
306. For a prominent critique of products liability law that raises these concerns, see PETER
W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENcES 3-11 (1988). The
increase in insurance premiums would parallel the increased price of consumer goods
attributable to products liability law, which Huber terms the "tort tax." See id. at 3-5.
Similarly, the potential administrative costs of the proposal parallel the criticisms of the
"reasonable alternative design" approach in products liability law as imposing a tremendous
burden on courts. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third
Restatement, and the Reinstatementof Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 931-32
(2005).
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language. 7 Moreover, state regulators could easily become involved
in helping to develop basic warnings that insurers could use with
little fear of liability. But the potential litigation effects of the
design defect proposal are more difficult to anticipate. First, the
amount that this proposal would increase litigation obviously
depends on whether the baseline jurisdiction's legal regime is
assumed to embrace a strong form of the reasonable expectations
doctrine."' Second, the way in which courts apply the insurance
harm screening mechanism would critically affect the resulting
increase in litigation. The insurance harm requirement is the key
way in which the design defect proposal attempts to limit
litigation. °s If courts interpreted this requirement too narrowly, the
proposal might well substantially increase the ultimate cost of
insurance.3 1 °
Not only does the products liability framework create potentially
significant costs, but its promised benefits-the improved efficiency
of insurance markets and protection of insurance consumersdepend on an admittedly optimistic view of courts' abilities. The
proposed framework requires courts to identify underwriting
purposes, alternative drafting options, and the foreseeability of
insurance harms. If courts do a poor job with these tasks, insurers
might be penalized for efficient drafting practices, such as retaining
partially outdated language because the costs of moving to new
language would be much larger. Both of these objections are
significant and point to the need for further research and debate.
The proposal, of course, is designed to take into account these
objections and to erect a system that both is administrable and
307. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
308. If so, litigation costs may well decrease as the insurance harm requirement screens
out a significant number of cases that the reasonable expectations doctrine does not. See
supranotes 273-76 and accompanying text.
309. See id.
310. It is not obvious whether the proposed doctrinal structure would increase the number
of lawsuits or merely the complexity of those lawsuits. One plausible hypothesis is that a
defective design regime would not increase the number of lawsuits because plaintiffs with a
viable defective design claim also have a viable interpretive claim that they would advance
regardless of other doctrinal details. To the extent that a clause is applied in a manner
inconsistent with its underwriting purpose-and thus an insurance harm exists-a plaintiff
likely has a decent argument that the clause itself is ambiguous and should be interpreted
against the drafter. See supra note 274.
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minimizes the resulting increase in litigation.3 1 ' Indeed, one of the
core benefits of the proposal is that it is fashioned from already
existing doctrines that, arguably, work reasonably well at improving
consumer safety markets without unduly increasing product prices
or burdening courts. In fact, judges in many respects are likely more
capable at applying the proposed doctrinal structure than they are
at applying products liability in tort law: judges' capacity to assess
the design of an insurance policy will be much more within their
core competence than their capacity to assess consumer products
such as lawnmowers and ladders. And, as noted earlier, the
insurance harm concept parallels the interpretive methods that
some courts occasionally employ to determine the meaning of an
insurance clause. 12 In the end, though, the specific proposals
developed above should serve as the starting point for further
discussion, rather than the end point for a new doctrine of insurance
law.
CONCLUSION

For over four decades, the critical wisdom in insurance law has
been that courts should regulate insurance policy terms to prevent
consumer exploitation and facilitate disclosure to insurance
consumers. For equally as long, the reasonable expectations
doctrine has served as the core basis for defining the appropriate
scope of such regulation. Yet both the practical and theoretical
foundations of this doctrine have been substantially undermined
during this time. Most courts have contorted the doctrine such that
it has virtually no practical effect, and those that have attempted to
develop a more capacious doctrine have seen their efforts uniformly
criticized by close studies of the case law. Moreover, contract law
scholars have developed an analytically rigorous explanation as to
why standard-form contracts do not necessarily present unique risks
for consumer exploitation.
This Article proposes a new doctrine for the judicial regulation of
insurance policies that parallels products liability law. Unlike the
reasonable expectations doctrine, which responds to the failure of
311. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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consumers to assent to insurance purchases, a products liability
approach responds to the market failures that plague many
consumer insurance markets. Because the structure of products
liability law parallels the structure of the judicial regulation of
insurance, it potentially holds the key to developing an administrable and analytically coherent basis for judicial intervention in
private insurance arrangements. At the very least, the products
liability model offers a new approach to improving private insurance
markets that is clearly tethered to the sources of such market
failure.
At the same time, the products liability proposal sanctions only
a limited role for the judiciary in regulating insurance. That role is
shaped by the core institutional advantage of courts-their ex post
perspective on insurance policy language.3 13 In many casesincluding Trent Lott's Hurricane Katrina claim-the relative
efficiencies of different coverage schemes will be beyond the
competence of courts to assess. 14 As the fate of the reasonable
expectations doctrine suggests, sanctioning judicial intervention in
insurance policy language is not a viable option in these situations.
Instead, expert regulators, with the time and resources to investigate competing empirical considerations, must take the lead.

313. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59; text accompanying notes 275-76.
314. See text accompanying notes 267-68.

